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Abstract
Current reconfiguration techniques are based on starting the system in a consistent configuration,
in which all participating entities are in a predefined state. Starting from that state, the system must
preserve consistency as long as a predefined churn rate of processors joins and leaves is not violated,
and unbounded storage is available. Many working systems cannot control this churn rate and do not
have access to unbounded storage. System designers that neglect the outcome of violating the above
assumptions may doom the system to exhibit illegal behaviors. We present the first automatically re-
covering reconfiguration scheme that recovers from transient faults, such as temporal violations of the
above assumptions. Our self-stabilizing solutions regain safety automatically by assuming temporal ac-
cess to reliable failure detectors. Once safety is re-established, the failure detector reliability is no longer
needed. Still, liveness is conditioned by the failure detector’s unreliable signals. We show that our
self-stabilizing reconfiguration techniques can serve as the basis for the implementation of several dy-
namic services over message passing systems. Examples include self-stabilizing reconfigurable virtual
synchrony, which, in turn, can be used for implementing a self-stabilizing reconfigurable state-machine
replication and self-stabilizing reconfigurable emulation of shared memory.
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1 Introduction
Motivation. We consider distributed systems that work in dynamic asynchronous environments, such as
a shared storage system [20]. Quorum configurations [21, 23], i.e., set of active processors (servers or
replicas), are typically used to provide services to the participants of the system. Since over time, the
(quorum) configuration may gradually lose active participants due to voluntary leaves and stop failures,
there is a need to allow the participation of newly arrived processors and from time to time to reconfigure
so that the new configuration is built on a more recent participation group. Over the last years, a number
of reconfiguration techniques have been proposed, mainly for state machine replication and emulation of
atomic memory (e.g., [1–5, 7, 8, 16–19, 22]). These reconfiguration techniques are based on starting the
system in a consistent configuration, in which all processors are in their initial state. Starting from that state,
the system must preserve consistency as long as a predefined churn rate of processors’ joins and leaves is
not violated and unbounded storage is available. Furthermore, they do not tolerate transient faults that can
cause an arbitrary corruption of the system’s state.
Many working systems cannot control their churn rate and do not have access to unbounded storage.
System designers that neglect the outcome of violating the above assumptions may doom the system to
forever exhibit a behavior that does not satisfy the system requirements. Furthermore, the dynamic and
difficult-to-predict nature of distributed systems gives rise to many fault-tolerance issues and requires effi-
cient solutions. Large-scale message passing networks are asynchronous and they are subject to transient
faults due to hardware or software temporal malfunctions, short-lived violations of the assumed failure rates
or violation of correctness invariants, such as the uniform agreement among all current participants about
the current configuration. Fault tolerant systems that are self-stabilizing [9] can recover after the occurrence
of transient faults (as long as the program’s code is still intact).
Our contributions and approach. We present the first automatically recovering reconfiguration scheme
that recovers from transient faults, such as temporary violations of the predefined churn rate or the un-
expected activities of processors and communication channels. Our blueprint for self-stabilizing recon-
figurable distributed systems can withstand a temporal violation of such assumptions, and recover once
conditions are resumed. It achieves this with only a bounded amount of local storage and message size.
Our self-stabilizing solutions regain safety automatically by assuming temporal access to reliable failure
detectors. Once safety is re-established, the failure detector reliability is no longer needed; still, liveness is
conditioned by the failure detector’s unreliable signals. We now overview our approach.
Reconfiguration scheme: Our scheme comprises of two layers that appear as a single “black-box” module to
an application that uses the reconfiguration service. The objective is to provide to the application a conflict-
free configuration, such that no two alive processors consider different configurations. The first layer, called
Reconfiguration Stability Assurance or recSA for short (detailed in Section 3.1), is mainly responsible for
detecting configuration conflicts (that could be a result of transient faults). It deploys a brute-force technique
for converging to a conflict-free new configuration. It also employs another technique for delicate configu-
ration replacement when a processor notifies that it wishes to replace the current configuration with a new
set of participants. For both techniques, processors use a failure detector (detailed in Section 2) to obtain
membership information, and configuration convergence is reached when failure detectors have temporal
reliability. Once a uniform configuration is installed, the failure detectors’ reliability is no longer needed
and from then on our liveness conditions consider unreliable failure detectors. The decision for requesting
a delicate reconfiguration is controlled by the other layer, called Reconfiguration Management or recMA for
short (detailed in Section 3.2).
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Specifically, if a processor suspects that the dependability of the current configuration is under jeopardy,
it seeks to obtain a majority approval from the alive members of the current configuration, and request a (del-
icate) reconfiguration from recSA. Moreover, in the absence of such a majority (e.g., configuration replace-
ment was not activated “on time” or the churn assumptions were violated), the recMA can aim to control the
recovery via an recSA reconfiguration request. Note that the current participant set can, over time, become
different than the configuration member set. As new members arrive and others leave, changing the configu-
ration based on system membership would imply a high frequency of (delicate) reconfigurations, especially
in the presence of high churn. We avoid unnecessary reconfiguration requests by requiring a weak liveness
condition: if a majority of the configuration set has not collapsed, then there exists at least one processor
that is known to trust this majority in the failure detector of each alive processor. Such active configuration
members can aim to replace the current configuration with a newer one (that would provide an approving
majority for prospective reconfigurations) without the use of the brute-force stabilization technique.
Joining mechanism: We complement our reconfiguration scheme with a self-stabilizing joining mechanism
(detailed in Section 3.3) that manages and controls the inclusion of new processors into the system. Here
extra care needs to be taken so that newly joining processors do not “contaminate” the system state with stale
information (due to arbitrary faults). For this, together with other techniques, we follow a snap-stabilizing
data link protocol (see Section 2). We have designed our joining mechanism so that the decision of whether
new members should be included in the system or not is application-controlled. In this way, the churn
(regarding new arrivals) can be “fine-tuned” based on the application requirements; we have modeled this by
having joining processors obtaining approval from a majority of the members of the current configuration (if
no reconfiguration is taking place). These, in turn, provide such approval if the application’s (among other)
criteria are met. We note that in the event of transient faults, such as an unavailable approving majority,
recSA ensures recovery via brute-force stabilization that includes all alive processors.
Applications: We demonstrate the usability and modularity of our self-stabilizing reconfiguration scheme
and joining mechanism by using them to develop self-stabilizing dynamic participation versions of several
algorithms: a label algorithm for providing a bounded self-stabilizing labeling scheme (Section 4.1); a
self-stabilizing counter increment algorithm (Section 4.2); a self-stabilizing virtual synchrony algorithm
that leads to self-stabilizing state machine replication and a self-stabilizing MWMR emulation of shared
memory (Section 4.3). These algorithms are derived by combining our reconfiguration scheme and joining
mechanism with the corresponding self-stabilizing algorithms developed for static membership systems
in [11].
Related work. As mentioned, existing solutions for providing reconfiguration in dynamic systems, such
as [17] and [2], do not consider transient faults and self-stabilization, because their correctness proofs (im-
plicitly) depend on a coherent start [20] and also assume that fail-stops can never prevent the (quorum)
configuration to facilitate configuration updates. They also often use unbounded counters for ordering con-
sensus messages (or for shared memory emulation) and by that facilitate configuration updates, e.g., [17].
Our self-stabilizing solution recovers after the occurrence of transient faults, which we model as an arbitrary
starting state, and guarantees a consistent configuration that provides (quorum) services, e.g., allowing read-
ing from and writing to distributed shared memory objects, and at the same time managing the configuration
providing these services.
Significant amount of research was dedicated in characterizing the fault-tolerance guarantees that can
be provided by difference quorum system designs; see [23] for an in depth discussion. In this paper we use
majorities, which is regarded as the simplest form of a quorum system (each set composed of a majority of
the processors is a quorum). Our reconfiguration scheme can be modified to support more complex, quorum
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systems, as long as processors have access to a mechanism (a function actually) that given a set of processors
can generate the specific quorum system. Another important design decision is when a reconfiguration
(delicate in our case) must take place; see the related discussion in [20]. One simple decision would be
to reconfigure when a fraction (e.g., 1/4th) of the members of a configuration appear to have failed. More
complex decisions could use prediction mechanisms (possibly based on statistics). This issue is outside
of the scope of this work; however, we have designed our reconfiguration scheme (specifically the recMA
layer) to be able to use any decision mechanism imposed by the application (via an application interface).
2 System Settings
Processing entities. We consider an asynchronous message-passing system of processors. Each processor
pi has a unique identifier, i, taken from a totally-ordered set of identifiers P . The number of live and
connected processors at any time of the computation is bounded by some N such that N  |P |. We refer
to such processors as active. We assume that the processors have knowledge of the upper bound N , but not
of the actual number of active processors. Processors may stop-fail by crashing; a processor may crash at
any point without warning, and in this event a crashed processor takes no further steps and never rejoins
the computation. (For readability sake, we model rejoins as transient faults rather than considering them
explicitly. Self-stabilization inherently deals with rejoins by regarding the past join information as possibly
corrupted.) New processors may join the system (using a joining procedure) at any point in time with an
identifier drawn from P , such that this identifier is only used by this processor forever. A participant is
an active processor that has joined the computation. Note that N accounts for all active processors, both
participants and those that are still joining.
Communication. The network topology is that of a fully connected graph, and links have a bounded
capacity cap. Processors exchange low-level messages called packets to enable a reliable delivery of high
level messages. Packets sent may be lost, reordered, or duplicated but not arbitrarily created, although the
channels may initially (after transient faults) contain stale packets, which due to the boundedness of the
channels are also bounded in a number that is in O(N2cap). We assume the availability of self-stabilizing
protocols for reliable FIFO end-to-end message delivery over unreliable channels with bounded capacity,
such as the ones of [10] or [12].
Specifically, when processor pi sends a packet, pkt1, to processor pj , the operation send inserts a copy
of pkt1 into the FIFO queue representing the communication channel from pi to pj . Since links are bounded
in capacity, the new packet might be omitted or some already sent packet may be lost. While we assume
that packets can spontaneously be omitted, i.e., lost from the channel, a packet that is sent infinitely often is
received infinitely often. Namely, the communication channels provide fair communication. The policy of
acknowledging is that acknowledgments are sent only when a packet arrives, and not spontaneously. Packet
pkt1 is retransmitted until more than the total capacity acknowledgments arrive, and then pkt2 starts being
transmitted. This forms an abstraction of token carrying messages between the two processors. In this way
the two processors (sender and receiver) can continuously exchange a “token”. We use this token exchange
technique to implement a heartbeat for detecting whether a processor is active or not; when a processor in
no longer active, the token will not be returned back to the other processor.
Due to the possibility of arbitrary faults and of the dynamic nature of the network, we cannot assume that
processors have knowledge of the identifier of the processor with which they are communicating. We employ
two anti-parallel data-link protocols, where every packet of one data-link is identified by the identifiers of
the sender and receiver of the data link it participates in. For example, if the communication link connects
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pi and pj , packets of the data link in which pi (pj) acts as the sender that traverse from pi to pj (pj to pi)
are identified by the label pi (pj), while the label of packets traversing from pj (pi) are extended by adding
pj (pi) to the label to form the label px, pj (px, pi, respectively). Any packet px, py arriving to pi (pj) where
x 6= i (x 6= j) is ignored. Thus, eventually the data link in which pi is the sender is implemented by packets
with label pi (pj) traversing from pi to pj (pj to pi). The analogous holds for the packets implementing the
data link in which pj serves as the sender. Thus, both parties will eventually know the identifier of the other
party and regard the token of the data link in which the sender has the greater identifier among them, to be
the used token.
Using the underlying packet exchange protocol described, a processor pi that has received a packet from
some processor pj which did not belong to pi’s failure detector, engages in a two phase protocol with pj in
order to “clean” their intermediate link. This is done before any messages are delivered to the algorithms that
handle reconfiguration, joining and applications. We follow the snap-stabilizing data link protocol detailed
in [15]. A snap-stabilizing protocol is one which allows the system (after faults cease) to behave according to
its specification upon its first invocation. We require that every data-link established between two processors
is initialized and cleaned straight after it is established. In contrast to [15] where the protocol is run on a tree
and initiated from the root, our case requires that each pair of processors takes the responsibility of cleaning
their intermediate link. Snap-stabilizing data links do not ignore signals indicating the existence of new
connections, possibly some physical carrier signal from the port. In fact, when such a connection signal is
received by the newly connected parties, they start a communication procedure that uses the bound on the
packet in transit and possibly in buffers too, to clean all unknown packets in transit, by repeatedly sending
the same packet until more than the round trip capacity acknowledgments arrive.
(N,Θ)-failure detector. We consider the (N,Θ)-failure detector that uses the token exchange and heart-
beat detailed above. This is an extension of the Θ-failure detector used in [6]. It allows each processor pi
to order other processors according to how recently they have communicated. Each processor pi maintains
an ordered heartbeat count vector nonCrashed, with an entry corresponding to each processor pk that ex-
changes the token (i.e., sends a heartbeat) with pi. Specifically, whenever pi receives the token from pj , it
sets the count corresponding to pj to 0 and increments the count of every other processor by one. In this
way, pi manages to rank every processor pk according to the token exchanges that it has performed with pi
in relation to the token exchanges that it has performed with some other processor pj . So the processor that
has most recently contacted pi is the first in pi’s vector.
The technique enables pi to obtain an estimate on the number of processors ni that are active in the
system; ni ≤ N . Assuming that pc is the most recently crashed processor, then every processor other
than pc will eventually exchange the token with pi many times, and their heartbeat count will be set to
zero, while pc’s will be increasing continuously. Eventually, every other processor’s count (given they
remain alive and communicating) will become lower than pc’s and pc will be ranked last in nonCrashed.
Moreover, while difference between heartbeat counts of non-crashed processors does not become large,
the difference of these counts and that of pc increases to form a significant ever-expanding “gap”. The
last processor before the gap is the nith processor and this provides an estimate on the number of active
processors. Since there are at most N processors in the computation at any given time, we can ignore any
processors that rank below the N th vector entry. If, for example, the first 30 processors in the vector have
corresponding counters of up to 30, then the 31st will have a count much greater than that, say 100; so ni
will be estimated at 30. This estimation mechanism is suggested in [13] and in [14].
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Figure 1: The reconfiguration scheme modules internal interaction and the interaction with the application.
The Reconfiguration Stability Assurance (recSA) layer provides information on the current configuration and
on whether a reconfiguration is not taking place using the getConfig() and noReco() interfaces. This is
based of local information. The Reconfiguration Management (recMA) layer uses the prediction mechanism
evalConfig() which is application based to evaluate whether a reconfiguration is required. If a reconfiguration
is required, recMA initiates it with estab(). Joining only proceeds if a configuration is in place and if no re-
configuration is taking place. When the joining mechanism has received a permission to access the application
(using passQuery()) it can then join via participate(). The direction of an arrow from a module A to a module
B illustrates the transfer of the specific information from A to B.
The interleaving model and self-stabilization. A program is a sequence of (atomic) steps. Each atomic
step starts with local computations and ends with a communication operation, i.e., packet send or receive.
We assume the standard interleaving model where at most one step is executed in every given moment. An
input event can either be the arrival of a packet or a periodic timer triggering pi to (re)send. Note that the
system is asynchronous and the rate of the timer is totally unknown. The state, ci, consists of pi’s variable
values and the content of pi’s incoming communication channels. A step executed by pi can change the
state of pi. The tuple of the form (c1, c2, · · · , cn) is used to denote the system state. An execution (or run)
R = c0, a0, c1, a1, . . . is an alternating sequence of system states cx and steps ax, such that each cx+1,
except the initial system state c0, is obtained from cx by the execution of ax. A practically infinite execution
is an execution with many steps, where many is defined to be proportional to the time it takes to execute
a step and the life-span time of a system. The system’s task is a set of executions called legal executions
(LE) in which the task’s requirements hold. An algorithm is self-stabilizing with respect to LE when every
(unbounded) execution of the algorithm has a suffix that is in LE.
3 Self-stabilizing Reconfiguration Scheme
The reconfiguration scheme is composed of the Reconfiguration Stability Assurance (recSA) layer (Sec-
tion 3.1), the Reconfiguration Management (recMA) layer (Section 3.2), and is accompanied by the Joining
Mechanism (Section 3.3). Figure 1 depicts the interaction between the modules and with the application.
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The Reconfiguration Stability Assurance (recSA) layer ensures that participants eventually have a common
configuration set. It also introduces processors that want to join the computation and provides information
on the current configuration and on whether a reconfiguration is not taking place using the getConfig()
and noReco() interfaces, respectively.
The Reconfiguration Management (recMA) layer strives to maintain a majority of active processors
of the configuration set, to this end, and may also request a reconfiguration from recSA via the estab()
interface. This is done when a configuration majority is suspected as collapsed or if a majority of active
processor configuration members appears to require a reconfiguration based on some application-defined
prediction function (evalConf()). A joining mechanism gives the application the leverage required to
control participation and ensure that processors enter the computation with the most recent state. A joiner
becomes a participant via participate() only if passQuery() of a majority of configuration members is
reported as True. We now proceed with the details.
3.1 Reconfiguration Stability Assurance
We present the Reconfiguration Stability Assurance layer (recSA), a self-stabilizing algorithm for assuring
correct configuration while allowing the updates from the Reconfiguration Management layer (Section 3.2).
We first describe the algorithm (Section 3.1.1) and then we prove its correctness (Section 3.1.2).
3.1.1 Algorithm Description
We first present an overview of the algorithm and then proceed to a line-by-line description.
Overview
The recSA layer uses a self-stabilizing algorithm (Algorithm 3.1) for assuring correct configuration while
allowing the updates from the reconfiguration management layer. Algorithm 3.1 guarantees that (1) all
active processors have eventually identical copies of a single configuration, (2) when participants notify the
system that they wish to replace the current configuration with another, the algorithm selects one proposal
and replaces the current configuration with it, and (3) joining processors can become participants eventually.
The algorithm combines two techniques: one for brute force stabilization that recovers from stale infor-
mation and a complementary technique for delicate (configuration) replacement, where participants jointly
select a single new configuration that replaces the current one. As long as a given processor is not aware of
ongoing configuration replacements, Algorithm 3.1 merely monitors the system for stale information, e.g., it
makes sure that all participants have a single (non-empty) configuration. During these periods the algorithm
allows the invocation of configuration replacement processes (via the estab(set) interface, triggered by the
Reconfiguration Management layer) as well as the acceptance of joining processors as participants (via the
participate() interface, triggered by the Joining layer). During the process of configuration replacement,
the algorithm selects a single configuration proposal and replaces the current one with that proposal before
returning to monitor for configuration disagreements.
While the system reconfigures, there is no immediate need to allow joining processors to become partic-
ipants. By temporarily disabling this functionality, the algorithm can focus on completing the configuration
replacement using the current participant set. To that end, only participants broadcast their states at the end
of the do forever loop (line 29), and only their messages arrive to the other active processors (line 8). Joining
processors receive such messages, but cannot broadcast before their safe entry to the participants’ set via
the function participate() (line 8), which enables pi’s broadcasting. Note that non-participants monitor the
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Algorithm 3.1: Self-stabilizing Reconfiguration Stability Assurance; code for processor pi
1 Variables: The following arrays consider both pi’s own value (entry i) and pj’s most recently received value (entry j).
2 config[]: an array in which config[i] is pi’s view on the current configuration. Note that pi assigns the empty (configuration)
value ⊥ after receiving a conflicting (different) non-empty configuration value.
3 FD[]: an array in which FD[i] represents pi’s failure detector. Note that we consider only the trusted processors rather than
the suspected ones. Namely, crashed processors are eventually suspected.
4 FD[].part is the participant set, where FD[i].part is an alias for {pj ∈ FD[i] : config[j] 6= ]} and FD[j].part refers to the
last value received from pj . Namely, the FD field of every message encodes also this participation information.
5 prp[] is an array of pairs 〈phase ∈ {0, 1, 2}, set ⊆ P 〉, where prp[i] refers to pi’s configuration replacement notifications.
In the pair prp[i], the field set can either be ⊥ (‘no value’) or the proposed processor set.
6 echo[] is an array in which echo[i] is (FD[i].part, prp[i], all[i])’s alias and echo[j] refers to the most recent value that pi
received from pj after pj had responded to pi with the most recent values it got from pi.
7 all[] is an array of Booleans, where all[i] refers to the case in which pi observes that all trusted processors had noticed its
current (maximal) notification and they hold the same notification.
8 allSeen: a list of processors pk for which pi received the all[k] indication.
9 Interface functions:
10 function chsConfig() = return(choose({config[k]}pk∈FD[i] \ {]})), where choose(∅) = ⊥ else choose(set) ∈ set;
11 function getConfig() = {if noReco() then return(chsConfig()) else return(config[i])};
12 function noReco() = ((pi /∈ (∩pj∈FD[i]\{pi}FD[i])) ∨ (|{config[k]}pk∈FD[i] \ {]}| > 1) ∨ ({FD[i].part} 6=
{FD[k].part, echo[k].part}pk∈FD[i]) ∨ (@pk ∈ FD[i] : config[k] = ⊥) ∨ (prp[k] 6= dfltNtf)) /∗ invariant tests ∗/
13 function estab(set) = {if (noReco() ∧ (set /∈ {config[i], ∅})) then prp[i]← 〈1, set〉}
14 function participate() = {if (noReco()) then config[i]← chsConfig()}
15 Constants and macros: dfltNtf = 〈0,⊥〉 /∗ the default notification tuple ∗/
16 macro degree(k) = (2 · prp[k].phase+ |{1 : all[k]}|) /∗ pk’s most-recently-received prp degree ∗/
17 macro echoNoAll(k) = return ({(FD[i].part, prp[i])} = {(echo[j].part, echo[j].prp)}pj∈FD[i].part)
18 macro echo() = return ({(FD[i].part, prp[i], all[i])} = {echo[j]}pj∈FD[i].part)
19 macro same(k) = return ({(FD[i].part, prp[i])} = {(FD[k].part, prp[k])})
20 macro maxNtf() = {if {prp[k]}pk∈FD[i].part = {dfltNtf} then return ⊥ else return maxlex{prp[k]}pk∈FD[i].part}
21 macro configSet(val) = {foreach pk do (config[k], prp[k])← (val, dfltNtf)} /∗ access to pi’s config ∗/
22 macro increment(phs) = {select(phs) case 0: return 0; case 1: return 2; case 2: return 0;}
23 macro allSeen() = (FD[i].part ⊆ (allSeen ∪ {pi : all[i]}));
24 do forever begin
25 foreach pk /∈ FD[i].part do (config[k], prp[k])← (], dfltNtf); /∗ clean after crashes ∗/ if
((∃pk:((prp[k] = 〈0, s〉)∧ (s 6= ⊥))∨ (config[k] ∈ {⊥, ∅})))∨ (@pk, pk′ ∈ FD[i].part:|degree(k)−degree(k′)| >
1)∨(∃pk ∈ FD[i].part:((prp[i].phase = x)∧(prp[k].phase = (x+1)( mod 3))∧(pk /∈ allSeen)∧(x ∈ {1, 2}))∨
(|notifSet| > 1)∧(({(FD[i], FD[i].part)} = {(FD[k], FD[k].part)}pk∈FD[i].part)∧((config[i]∩FD[i].part) = ∅)))
where notifSet = {prp[k].set:∃pk′ ∈ FD[i].part:prp[k′] = 〈2, •〉}pk∈FD[i].part then configSet(⊥) if
(maxNtf() = ⊥) then /∗ when no notification arrived ∗/
26 if |{config[k]}pk∈FD[i] \ {⊥, ]}| > 1 then configSet(⊥); /∗ nullify the configuration upon conflict ∗/ if
(config[i] = ⊥ ∧ |{FD[j] : pj ∈ FD[i]}| = 1) then configSet(FD[i]); /∗ reset during admissible runs ∗/
27 else
28 all[i]← ∧pk∈FD[i].part(echoNoAll(k) ∧ same(k)); /∗ test all-the-same reports ∗/ foreach
pk ∈ FD[i].part : (echoNoAll(k) ∧ same(k)) do allSeen← allSeen ∪ {pk} if echo() ∧ allSeen() then
(prp[i].phase, allSeen)← (increment(prp[i].phase), ∅) {select(prp[i].phase) case 0: prp[i]← dfltNtf ,
case 1: prp[i]← maxNtf(), case 2: config[i]← prp[i].set};
29 if config[i] 6= ] then foreach pj ∈ FD[i] do send(〈FD[i], config[i], prp[i], all[i], (FD[j].part, prp[j], all[j])〉)
30 upon receive m = 〈FD, config, prp, all, echo〉 from pj do (FD[j], config[j], prp[j], all[j], echo[j])← m ;
31 upon interrupt pi’s booting do foreach pk do echo[k]← (config[k], prp[k], all[k])← (], dfltNtf, false)
intersection between the current configuration and the set of active participants (line 25). In case it is empty,
the processors (participants or not) essentially begin a brute-force stabilization (outlined below) where there
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Figure 2: The configuration replacement automaton
is no more blocking of joining processors to become participants.
Brute-force stabilization. The algorithm detects the presence of stale information and recovers from these
transient faults. Configuration conflicts are one of several kinds of such stale information and they refer to
differences in the field config, which stores the (quorum) configuration values. Processor pi can signal to all
processors that it had detected stale information by assigning ⊥ to configi and by that start a reset process
that nullifies all config fields in the system (lines 25 and 26). Algorithm 3.1 uses the brute-force technique
for letting processor pi to assign to configi its set of trusted processors (line 26), which the failure detector
FDi at processor pi provides. Note that by the end of the brute-force process, all active processors (joining
or participant) become participants. We show that eventually all active processors share identical (non-⊥)
config values by the end of this process.
Delicate (configuration) replacement. Participants can propose to replace the current configuration with
a new one, set, via the estab(set) interface. This replacement uses the configuration replacement process,
which for the purposes of the overview, we abstract it as the automaton depicted in Figure 2. When the
system is free from stale information, the configuration uniformity invariant (of the config field values) holds.
Then, any number of calls to the estab(set) interface starts the configuration replacement process, which
controls the configuration replacement using the following three phases: (1) selecting (deterministically and
uniformly) a single proposal (while verifying the eventual absence of “unselected” proposals), (2) replacing
(deterministically and uniformly) all config fields with the jointly selected proposal, and (3) bringing back
the system to a state in which it merely tests for stale information.
The configuration replacement process requires coordinated phase transition. Algorithm 3.1 lets proces-
sor pi to represent proposals as prpi[j] = (phase, set), where pj is the processor from which pi received
the proposal, phase ∈ {0, 1, 2} and set is a processor set or the null value, ⊥. The default proposal, 〈0,⊥〉,
refers to the case in which prp encodes “no proposal”. When pi calls the function estab(set), it changes
prp to 〈1, set〉 (line 8) as long as pi is not aware of an ongoing configuration replacement process, i.e.,
noReco() returns true. Upon this change, the algorithm disseminates prpi[i] and by that guarantees even-
tually that noReco() returns false for any processor that calls it. Once that happens, no call to estab(set)
adds a new proposal for configuration replacement and no call to participate() lets a joining processor to
become a participant (line 8). The algorithm can then use the lexical value of the prpi[]’s tuples for selecting
one of them deterministically (Figure 2). To that end, each participant makes sure that all other participants
report the same tuples by waiting until they “echo” back the same values as the ones it had sent to them.
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Once that happens, the participant pi makes sure that the communication channels do not include other “un-
selected” proposals by raising a flag (alli = true) and waiting for the echoed values of these three fields,
i.e., participant set, prpi[i] and alli. This waiting continues until the echoed values match the values of any
other active participant in the system (while monitoring their well-being). Before this participant proceeds,
it makes sure that all active participants have noticed its phase completion (line 28). Each processor p main-
tains the allSeen variable; a set of participants that have noticed p’s phase completion (line 28) and are thus
added to p’s allSeen set.
The above mechanism for phase transition coordination allows progression in a unison fashion. Namely,
no processor starts a new phase before it has seen that all other active participants have completed the current
phase and have noticed that all other have done so (because they have identical participants’ set, prp and
all[] values). This is the basis for emulating every step of the configuration replacement process (line 28)
and making sure that the phase 2 replacement occurs correctly before returning to phase 0, in which the
system simply tests for stale information. We show that since the failure detectors monitor the participants’
well-being, this process terminates.
Detailed Descripion
We now proceed to a detailed, line-by-line description of Algorithm 3.1.
Variables. The algorithm uses a number of fields that each active participant broadcasts to all other system
processors. The processor stores the values that they receive in arrays. Namely, we consider both pi’s own
value (the i-th entry) and pj’s most recently received value (the j-th entry).
• The field config[]: an array in which config[i] is pi’s view on the current configuration. Note that
pi assigns the empty (configuration) value ⊥ after receiving a conflicting (not the same) non-empty
configuration value, i.e., the received configuration is different than pi’s configuration. We use the
symbol ] for denoting that processor pi is not a participant, i.e., configi[i] = ].
• The field FD[] is an array in which FD[i] represents pi’s failure detector of trusted processors (without
the list of processors that are suspected to be crashed).
• FD[].part is the participants’ set, where FD[i].part is an alias for {pj ∈ FD[i] : config[j] 6= ]} and
FD[j].part refers to the last value received from pj . Namely, the FD field of every message encodes
also this participation information.
• The field prp[] is an array of pairs 〈phase ∈ {0, 1, 2}, set ⊆ P 〉, where prp[i] refers to pi’s config-
uration replacement notifications. In the pair prp[i], the field set can either be ⊥ (‘no value’) or the
proposed processor set.
• The field echo[] is an array in which echo[i] is an alias of (FD[i].part, prp[i], all[i]) and echo[j] refers
to the most recent value that pi has received from pj after pj had responded to pi with the most recent
values it got from pi.
• The field all[] is an array of Booleans, where all[i] refers to the case in which pi observes that all
trusted processors have noticed its current (maximal) notification and they hold the same notification.
• The variable allSeen is a set that includes the processors pk for which pi received the all[k] indication.
9
Constants, functions and macros. The constant dfltNtf (line 8) denotes the default notification tuple
〈0,⊥〉. The following functions define the interface between Algorithms 3.1 and 3.2 (Reconfiguration Man-
agement layer) and the Joining Mechanism (Algorithm 3.3). Note that the behavior which we specify below
considers legal executions.
• The function chsConfig() (line 8) returns config whenever there is a single such non-] value. Other-
wise, ⊥ is returned.
• The function getConfig() (line 8) allows Algorithms 3.2 and 3.3 to retrieve the value of the current
quorum configuration, i.e., configi[i]. We note that during legal executions, this value is a set of
processors whenever pi is a participant. However, this value can be ] whenever pi is not a participant
and ⊥ during the process of configuration reset.
• The function noReco() (line 8) returns truewhenever (1) pi was not recognized as a trusted processor
by a processor that pi trusts, (2) there are configuration conflicts, (3) the participant sets have yet
to stabilize, (4) there is an on-going process of brute force stabilization, or (5) there is a delicate
(configuration) replacement in progress. This part of the interface allows Algorithms 3.2 and 3.3
to test for the presence of local evidence according to which Algorithm 3.1 shall disable delicate
(configuration) replacement and joining to the participant set.
• The function estab(set) (line 8) provides an interface that allows the recMA layer to request from
Algorithm 3.1 to replace the current quorum configuration with the proposed set, which is a non-empty
group of participants. Note that Algorithm 3.1 disables this functionality whenever noReco() =
false or set = config[i].
• The function participate() (line 8) provides an interface that allows the Joining Mechanism to request
from Algorithm 3.1 to let pi join the participant set, which is the group that can participate in the
configuration and request the replacement of the current configuration with another (via the estab(set)
function). Note that Algorithm 3.1 disables this functionality whenever noReco() = false and thus
there exists a single configuration in the system, i.e., the call to chsConfig() (line 8) returns the
single configuration that all active participants store as their current quorum configuration. This is
except for case in which ({configi[k]}pk∈FDi[i] \ {]}) = ∅. Here, chsConfig() returns ⊥, which
starts a reset process in order to deal with a complete collapse where the quorum system includes no
active participants.
Algorithm 3.1 uses the following macros.
• The macro degree(k) (line 8) calculates the degree of pk’s most-recently-received notification degree,
which is twice the notification phase plus one whenever all participants are using the same notification
(and zero otherwise).
• The macros echoNoAll(k) and echo(k) (lines 8, and 8 respectively) test whether pi was acknowl-
edged by all participants for the values it has sent. The former function considers just the fields that
are related to its own participants’ set and notification, whereas the latter considers also the field all[].
• The macro same(k) (line 8) performs a similar tests to the one of echoNoAll(k), but considers only
processor pk’s most-recently-received values rather than all participants’ echoed ones.
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• The macro maxNtf() (line 8) selects a notification with the maximal lexicographical value or returns
⊥ in the absence of notification that is not the default (phase 0) notification. We define our lexico-
graphical order between prp1 and prp2, as prp1 ≤lex prp2 ⇐⇒ ((prp1.phase < prp2.phase) ∨
((prp1.phase = prp2.phase) ∧ (prp1.set ≤lex prp2.set))), where prp1.set ≤lex prp2.set can be
defined using a common lexical ordering and by considering sets of processors as ordered tuples that
list processors in, say, an ascending order with respect to their identifiers.
• The macro configSet(val) (line 8) acts as a wrapper function for accessing pi’s local copies of the
field config. This macro also makes sure that there are no (local) active notifications.
• The macro increment(phs) (line 8) performs the transition between the phases of the delicate con-
figuration replacement technique.
• The macro allSeen() (line 8) tests whether all active participants have noticed that all other partici-
pants have finished the current phase.
The do forever loop. A line-by-line walkthrough of the pseudocode of Algorithm 3.1 follows.
Cleaning up, removal of stale information and invariant testing. The do forever loop starts by making sure
that non-participant nodes cannot have an impact on pi’s computation (line 25) before testing that pi’s state
does not include any stale information (line 25). Algorithm 3.1 tests for several types of stale information
(c.f. Definition 3.1): (type-1) notifications in phase 0 must not have a set 6= ∅, (type-2) configurations
that refer to the empty set, execute configuration reset, or conflicting configurations, (type-3) the degree gap
between two notifications is greater than one, there are participants in different phases but the one in the
more advanced phase does not appear in the notifSet set, or the local set of notifications includes more
than one notification and at least one of them is in phase 2, and (type-4) the quorum configuration includes
at least one active participant (to avoid false positive error by testing only when processor pi has a stable
view of set of trusted processors and participants). In case any of these tests fails, the algorithm starts a
configuration reset process by calling configSet(⊥).
The brute-force stabilization technique. As long as no active notifications are present locally (line 25), ev-
ery processor performs this technique for transient fault recovery. In the presence of configuration conflicts,
the algorithm starts the configuration reset process (line 26). Moreover, during the configuration reset pro-
cess, the algorithm waits until all locally trusted processors report that they trust the same set of processors
(line 26).
The delicate replacement technique — phase synchronization. This technique synchronizes the system
phase transitions by making sure that all active participants work with the same notification.
Each active participant tests whether all other trusted participants have echoed their current participants’
set and notifications and have the same values with respect to these two fields (line 28). The success of this
test assigns true to the field alli[i]. The algorithm then extends this test to include also the field all[] (line 28).
Upon the success of this test with respect to participant pk, the algorithm adds pk to the set allSeeni. Once
processor pi receives reports from all participants that the current phase is over, it moves to the next phase
(line 28).
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The delicate replacement technique — finite-state-machine emulation. Each of the three phases represent
an automaton state (line 28); recall Figure 2 and the configuration replacement process discussed in the
Overview. During phase 1, the system converges to a single notification. During phase 2, the system
replaces the current configuration with the proposed one. Next, the system returns to its ideal state, i.e.,
phase 0, which allows new participants to join, as well as further reconfigurations.
Message exchange and the control of newly arrived processors. When a participant finishes executing the
do forever loop, it broadcasts its entire state (line 29). Once these messages arrive, processor pi stores them
(line 8). The only way for a newly arrived processor to start executing Algorithm 3.1 is by responding to
an interrupt call (line 8). This procedure notifies the processor state and makes sure that it cannot broadcast
messages (line 29). The safe entry of this newly arrived processor to the participants’ set, is via the function
participate() (line 8), which enables pi’s broadcasting. Thus, non-participants merely follow the system
messages until the function noReco() returns true and allows its join to the participant set by a call (from
the Joining Mechanism) to the function participate() (line 8).
3.1.2 Correctness
We first provide an outline of the proof and then proceed in steps to establish the correctness of the algorithm.
Outline
We say that system state c has no stale information when (1) all the notifications are valid, (2) there are no
configuration conflicts or active reset process, (3) the phase information (including the set allSeen) are not
out of synch, and (4) there are active participants in config. The correctness proof of Algorithm 3.1 shows
that eventually there is no stale information, because they are all cleaned (line 25) or detected and cause
configuration reset by calling configSet(⊥) (line 25).
In the absence of notifications (line 25), Algorithm 3.1 merely tests for configuration conflicts (line 26)
and during a configuration reset, it waits until all locally trusted processors report that they trust the same
processors (line 26) before these processors become the configuration. I.e., it applies the brute force sta-
bilization technique. The proof here shows that during admissible executions, the ⊥ symbol propagates to
all of the config fields in the system until all active processors assign to config either ⊥ or the entire set of
trusted processors. This reset process ends when all processors assign merely the latter value to config.
In the presence of notifications, Algorithm 3.1 synchronizes the system phase transitions by making sure
that all active participants work with the same notification (lines 28 to 28) before moving to the next phase
(line 28). The algorithm’s three phases represent an automaton state (line 28). During phase 1, the system
converges to a single notification. While phase = 2 holds, the system replaces the current configuration
with the proposed one. Next, the system returns to its no-notifications state, i.e., phase = 0, which allows
new participants as well as further reconfigurations. When a participant finishes the do forever loop, it
broadcasts its entire state (line 29). Once these messages arrive, the receiving processor stores them (line 8).
The only way for a newly arrived processor to start executing Algorithm 3.1 is by responding to an
interrupt call (line 8). This procedure nullifies the state of the newly arrived processor with config = ] and
by that makes sure that it cannot broadcast (line 29). The safe entry of this processor to the participating set,
is via the function participate() (line 8), which enables pi’s broadcasting. Thus, non-participants merely
follow the system messages until the function noReco() returns true and allows its join to the participant
set by a call to participate() (line 8). By controlling the new joins, the three phase structure is the basis
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for proving the final theorem stating that eventually a common configuration set is adopted by every active
processor. We now proceed to the detailed proof.
Configuration conflicts and stale information
We begin by classifying the stale information into four types.
Definition 3.1 We say that processor pi in system state c has a stale information in c of:
type-1: when (∃pk : ((prp[k] = 〈0, s〉) ∧ (s /∈ {∅,⊥}))) (cf. line 25).
type-2: when (∃pk : (config[k] ∈ {⊥, ∅})) (cf. line 25) or c encodes a (configuration) conflict, i.e.,
there are two active processors pi and pj for which configi[i] 6= configj [j], configi[i] 6= configi[j], or
mj,i.config 6= configi[i] in any message in the communication channel from pi to pj .
type-3: when (@pk, pk′ ∈ FDi[i].part : |degreei(k) − degreei(k′)| > 1) ∨ (∃pk ∈ FDi[i] :
((prpi[i].phase = x) ∧ (prpi[k].phase = (x + 1)(mod 3)) ∧ (pk /∈ allSeeni) ∧ (x ∈ {1, 2})) ∨
(|notifSeti| > 1)), where notifSeti = {prpi[k].set : ∃pk′ ∈ FDi[i].part : prpi[k′] = 〈2, •〉}pk∈FDi[i].
type-4: when (({(FDi[i],FDi[i].part)} = {(FDi[k],FDi[k].part)}pk∈FDi[i].part) ∧ ((configi[i] ∩
FDi[i].part) = ∅)).
Claim 3.1 (Eventually there is no type-1 stale information) Eventually the system reaches a state c ∈ R
in which the invariant of no type-1 stale information holds thereafter.
Proof. Let c ∈ R be a system state in which processor pi has an applicable step ai that includes the execution
of the do forever loop (line 8 to 29). We note that immediately after ai, processor pi has no type-1 stale
information (line 25 removes it). Moreover, that removal always occurs before ai sends any message m
(line 29). Therefore, eventually for every active processor pj that receives from pi message m (line 8), it
holds that (m.phase = 0) ⇐⇒ (m.prp = (0,⊥)) as well as for every item prpi[k] : pk ∈ P . Once this
invariant holds for every pair of active processors pi and pj , the system reaches state c. We conclude the
proof by noting that Algorithm 3.1 never assigns to prpi[j] a values that violates this claim invariant. 2
Replacement state and message; explicit and spontaneous replacements
We say that a processor pi’s state encodes a (delicate) replacement when prpi[j] 6= 〈0,⊥〉 and we say that a
message mi,j in the channel from pi to pj encodes a (delicate) replacement when its prp 6= 〈0,⊥〉. Given a
system execution R, we say that R does not include an explicit (delicate) replacement when throughout R
no node pi calls estab(). Suppose that execution R does not include an explicit (delicate) replacement and
yet there is a system state c ∈ R in which a processor state or a message in the communication channels
encodes a (delicate) replacement. In this case, we say that R includes a spontaneous (delicate) replacement.
Lemma 3.2 (Eventually there is no type-2 stale information) Let R be an admissible execution that does
not include explicit (delicate) replacements nor spontaneous ones. The system eventually reaches a state
c ∈ R in which the invariant of no type-2 stale information holds thereafter.
Proof. Note that any of R’s steps that includes the do forever loop (line 8 to 29) does not run lines 28
to 28 (since R does not include an explicit nor spontaneous replacement). If R’s starting system state does
not include any configuration conflicts, we are done. Suppose that R’s starting system state does include a
conflict, i.e., ∃pi, pj ∈ P : (configi[i] = ⊥) ∨ (configi[i] 6= configi[j]) ∨ (configi[i] 6= configj [j]) or there
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is a message, mi,j , in the communication channel from pi to pj , such that the field (mi,j .config[k] = ⊥) :
pk ∈ FDi[i] ∨ (mi,j .config 6= configi[i]), where both pi and pj are active processors. In Claims 3.3, 3.4
and 3.5 we show that in all of these cases, eventually ∀pi ∈ P : configi[i] ∈ {⊥,FDi[i]} before showing
that eventually there are no configuration conflicts (Claim 3.6).
Claims 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5 consider the values in the field config that are either held by an active processor
pi ∈ P or in its outgoing communication channel to another active processor pj ∈ P . We define the set
S = {Si ∪ S outi}pi∈P to be the set of all these values, where Si = {configi[j]}pj∈FDi[i] and S outi =
{mi,j .config}pj∈FDi[i].
Claim 3.3 Suppose that in R’s starting system state, there are processors pi, pj ∈ P that are active in R,
for which |S \ {⊥, ]}| > 1, where ∃S′ ⊆ S : S′ ∈ {{configi[i], configi[j]}, {configi[i],mi,j .config}}.
Eventually the system reaches a state in which configi[i] ∈ {⊥,FDi[i]} holds.
Proof. Suppose that S′ = {configi[i], configi[j]} holds. Immediately after R’s starting state, processor pi
has an applicable step that includes the execution of the do forever loop (line 8 to 29). In that step, the
if-statement condition (|{configi[k] : pk ∈ FDi[i]} \ {⊥, ]}| > 1) (line 26’s if-statement) holds, pi assigns
⊥ to configi[i] and the proof is done. Suppose that S′ = {configi[i],mi,j .config} holds. Upon mi,j’s arrival,
processor pi assigns mi,j .config to configi[j] (line 8) and the case of S
′ = {configi[i], configi[j]} holds. 2
Claim 3.4 Suppose that in R’s starting system state, there are processors pi, pj ∈ P that are active in R,
for which |S \ {⊥, ]}| > 1, where ∃S′ ⊆ S : S′ ∈ {{configi[i], configj [j]}}. Eventually the system reaches
a state in which configi[i] ∈ {⊥,FDi[i]} or configj [j] ∈ {⊥,FDi[i]} holds.
Proof. Suppose, towards a contradiction, for any system state c ∈ R that neither configi[i] ∈ {⊥,FDi[i]}
nor configj [j] ∈ {⊥,FDi[i]}. Note that pi and pj exchange messages eventually, because whenever
processor pi repeatedly sends the same message to processor pj , it holds that pj receives that mes-
sage eventually (the fair communication assumption, Section 2) and vice versa. Such message exchange
implies that the case of |S \ {⊥, ]}| > 1 (Claim 3.3) holds eventually, where ∃S′ ⊆ S : S′ ∈
{{configi[i],mi,j .config}, {configj [j],mi,j .config}}. Thus, we reach a contradiction and therefore even-
tually the system reaches a state in which configi[i] ∈ {⊥,FDi[i]} or configj [j] ∈ {⊥,FDi[i]} hold. 2
Claim 3.5 Suppose that in R’s starting system state, there is a processor pi ∈ P that is active in R, for
which configi[i] ∈ {⊥,FDi[i]}. (1) For any system state c ∈ R, it holds that configi[i] ∈ {⊥,FDi[i]}. More-
over, (2) R = R′ ◦R′′ has a suffix, R′′, for which ∀c′′ ∈ R′′ : ∀pi, pj : ({mi,j .config, configj [i], configj [j]}\
{⊥,FDi[i]}) = ∅.
Proof. We prove each part of the statement separately.
Part (1). We start the proof by noting that ∀pi, pj ∈ P , it holds that, throughout R, we have that FDi[i]’s
value does not change and that FDi[i] = FDj [j], because this lemma assumes that R is admissible. To
show that configi[i] ∈ {⊥,FDi[i]} holds in any c ∈ R, we argue that any step ai ∈ R in which pi changes
configi[i]’s value includes the execution of line 26 or line 26 (see the remark at the beginning of this lemma’s
proof about ai ∈ R not including the execution of lines 28 to 28), which assign to configi[i] the values ⊥,
and respectively, FDi[i].
Part (2). In this part of the proof, we first consider the values in mi,j .config and configj [i] before consider-
ing the one in configj [j].
Part (2.1). To show that in c′′ ∈ R′′ it holds that ∀pi, pj : {mi,j .config, configj [i]} \ {⊥,FDi[i]} = ∅, we
note that when pi loads a message mi,j (line 29) before sending to processor pj , it uses configi[i]’s value for
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the field config. Thus, eventually mi,j .config ∈ {⊥,FDi[i]} and therefore configj [i] ∈ {⊥,FDi[i]} records
correctly in c′′ ∈ R′′ the most recent mi,j’s value that pj receives from pi (line 8).
Part (2.2). To show that eventually configj [j] ∈ {⊥,FDi[i]}, we note that once pj changes the value
of configj [j], it holds that configj [j] ∈ {⊥,FDi[i]} thereafter (due to the remark in the beginning of this
lemma, which implies that only lines 26 and 26 can change configj [j], and by the part (1) of this claim’s
proof while replacing the index i with j). Suppose, towards a contradiction, that pj does not change that
value of configj [j] throughout R and yet configj [j] /∈ {⊥,FDi[i]}. Note that (|{FD[j] : pj ∈ FD[i]}| = 1)
(see the second clause of the if-statement condition in line 26) holds throughout R, because R is admissible.
Therefore, whenever pi takes a step that includes the execution of the do forever loop (line 8 to 29), processor
pi sends to pj the message mi,j , such that mi,j .config = configi[i] (line 29) and configi[i] = FDi[i] (see
part (2.1) of this proof). Since pi sends mi,j repeatedly, processor pj receives eventually mi,j (the fair
communication assumption, Section 2) and stores in configj [i] = mi,j .config = configi[i] = FDi[i] 6= ⊥.
Immediately after that step, the system state allows pj to take a step in which the condition (|{configj [k] :
p′j ∈ FDj [k]} \ {⊥, ]}| > 1) (line 26’s if-statement) holds and pj changes configj [j]’s value to ⊥. Thus,
this part of the proof end with a contradiction, which implies that the system reaches a state in which
configj [j] ∈ {⊥,FDi[i]}. 2
Claim 3.6 Suppose that in R’s starting system state, it holds that for every two processors pi, pj ∈ P
that are active in R, we have that ({configi[i], configj [i],mi,j .config} \ {⊥,FDi[i]}) = ∅, where mi,j is a
message in the channel from pi to pj . Eventually the system reaches a state in which configi[i] = FDi[i].
Proof. By this claim assumptions, we have that in R’s starting system state, the if-statement condition
(|{configi[k] : pk ∈ FDi[k]} \ {⊥, ]}| > 1) (line 26) does not hold. Moreover, |{FDi[j] : pj ∈ FDi[i]}| = 1
(line 26) holds throughout R, because R is admissible. Therefore, this claim assumptions with respect to
R’s starting states actually hold for any system state c ∈ R, because only lines 26 and 26 can change the
value of configi[i] ∈ {⊥,FDi[i]}, which later pi uses for sending the message mi,j (line 29), and thus also
mi,j .config ∈ {⊥,FDi[i]} as well as configj [i] ∈ {⊥,FDi[i]} records correctly the most recent mi,j’s that
pj receives from pi (line 8).
To conclude this proof, we note that immediately after any system state c ∈ R, processor pi has an
applicable step ai ∈ R that includes the execution of line 26 (by similar arguments to the ones used by the
first part of this proof). Moreover, ai does not include the execution of line 26, because by the first part of
this proof the condition of the if-statement of line 26 does not hold. In the system state that immediately
follow ai, the invariant configi[i] = FDi[i] holds. 2
By this lemma’s assumption, there is no configuration c ∈ R replacement state nor replacement message.
Claim 3.6 implies that the system reaches a state cnoConf ∈ R that has no configuration conflict eventually.
Thus, cnoConf is safe. 2
Claim 3.7 (Eventually there is no type-4 stale information) Let R be an admissible execution of Algo-
rithm 3.1. Eventually the system reaches a state c ∈ R in which the invariant of no type-4 stale information
holds thereafter.
Proof. Without the loss of generality, suppose that there is no system state in R that encodes a configuration
conflict. (We can make this assumption without losing generality because Lemma 3.2 implies that this claim
is true whenever this assumption is false.) Moreover, let c ∈ R be a system state in which processor pi has
an applicable step ai that includes the execution of the do forever loop (line 8 to 29).
Since R is admissible, ({(FDi[i],FDi[i].part)} = {(FDi[k],FDi[k].part)}pk∈FDi[i].part) holds in c.
Therefore, the case in which ((configi[i]∩FDi[i].part) = ∅) in c implies a call to the function configSet(⊥)
(line 25) in the step that immediately follows. By using Lemma 3.2, we have that this lemma is true. 2
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Phase and degree progressions
Let R be an execution of Algorithm 3.1 that is admissible with respect to the participant sets. Suppose that
pi is a processor that is active in R and that pi ∈ FD[i].part. We say that processor pi is an active participant
in R. Let pi, pj , pk ∈ P be processors that are active participants in R and c ∈ R a system state. We de-
note by NA(c) = {(prpj [k], allj [k])}pj ,pk∈FDi[i] ∪ {(prpj [k], allj [k]) : mj,k = 〈•, prpj [k], allj [k], (•)〉 ∈
channelk,j}pj ,pk∈FDi[i] ∪ {(echoj [k].prp, echoj [k].all) : mj,k = 〈•, (•, echoj [k].prp, echoj [k].all)〉 ∈
channelk,j}pj ,pk∈FDi[i] \ {(〈0,⊥〉, •)} the set of all pairs that includes the notification and all fields that
appear in c (after excluding the default notification, 〈0,⊥〉, while including all the information in the pro-
cessors’ states and communication channels as well as their replications, e.g., the echo field). We denote by
N(c) = {n : (n, a) ∈ NA(c)} the set of notifications that appear in c. We denote the degree set of notifica-
tion n ∈ N(c) by D(c, n) = {2 · n.phase + |{1 : a}| : (n, a) ∈ NA(c)}. For a given system state c ∈ R,
notification n ∈ N(c) that appears in c, we denote by S(c, n) = {n′ : ((n′ ∈ N(c)) ∧ (n.set = n′.set))} the
set of all notifications n′ ∈ N(c) that have the same set filed as the one of n and S(c) = {n.set : n ∈ N(c)}
is the set of all notification sets in c.
Lemma 3.8 Let R be an execution of Algorithm 3.1 that is admissible with respect to the participant sets
and that does not include an explicit (delicate) replacement. Suppose that in R’s starting system state, c,
there are notifications, i.e., N(c) 6= ∅. Let n ∈ N(c) be a notification for which it holds that ∀n′ ∈ N(c) :
n′ ≤lex n in c (recall the definition of ≤lex in the description of the maxNtf() macro). The system reaches
eventually a state c@n ∈ R in which S(c@n, n) = ∅.
Proof. Let a ∈ R be a step that immediately precedes the system state c ∈ R and c′ ∈ R be the system
state that immediately follows a. Note that when the system reaches a system state c′ ∈ R in which
∃n : (S(c, n) ∩ S(c′, n)) 6= ∅, the proof is done. Suppose, in the way of a proof by contradiction, that this
lemma is false, i.e., @c@n ∈ R : (S(c, n)∩S(c@n, n)) = ∅, i.e., the notification n (and additional notifications
that have the same proposed set but different phase number) does not “disappear” from the system after any
step and “become” the default notification 〈0,⊥〉. Claims 3.9, 3.10 and 3.12 are needed for the proof of
Claim 3.13, which completes this proof by contradiction.
Claim 3.9 Suppose that @c@n ∈ R : (S(c, n)∩S(c@n, n)) = ∅. Without the loss of generality, we can assume
that (1) no step in R includes a call to configSet(⊥), (2) n’s lexical value in R’s starting system state, c,
is the greater or equal to the lexical value of any notification in any system state c′′ ∈ R, (3) prpi[i] = n in
R’s starting system state, where pi ∈ P is an active participant in R, and (4) step a ∈ R that immediately
follows R’s starting system state includes the execution of the do forever loop (line 8 to 29).
Proof. We prove each part of the claim separetly.
Part (1). This claim’s assumption that @c@n ∈ R : (S(c, n) ∩ S(c@n, n)) = ∅ implies that no step in R
includes a call to configSet(⊥), say, due to the if-statement condition of lines 25 or 26 hold in any system
state c′′ ∈ R. The reason is that Claim 3.4 implies that a call to configSet(⊥) brings the system to a state
c′′′ ∈ R in which S(c′′′, n) = ∅. Namely, c′′′ = c@n and the proof of this lemma is done.
Part (2). We can choose a suffix ofR, such that n’s lexical value inR’s starting system state, c, is the greater
or equal to the lexical value of any notification in any system state c′′ ∈ R. We can do that because there is
a bounded number of possible lexical values and our assumption that @c@n∈R : (S(c, n) ∩ S(c@n, n)) = ∅.
Part (3). We note that when considering the case in which c encodes a message mi,j that has n in one of
its fields, message mi,j reaches eventually from pj to pi (the fair communication assumption, Section 2).
Therefore, we suppose that notification n is encoded in pi’s state, i.e., prpi[j] = n in c, where pi, pj ∈ P are
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active participants in R. We can make this assumption, without the loss of generality, because we can take
a suffix of R (that system reaches eventually) in which this assumption holds for its starting configuration
and then we take that suffix to be the execution that this lemma considers, i.e., R. Using similar arguments
about generality, we also assume that step a includes the execution of the do forever loop (line 8 to 29), and
thus prpi[i] = n in c
′.
Part (4). Use the same arguments as for part (3) of this proof. 2
Claim 3.10 Suppose that step a includes the execution of the do forever loop (line 8 to 29) immediately
after and before the system states c, and respectively, c′. When prpi[i].set = n.set holds in c, we have that
prpi[i].phase ≥ n.phase does not decrease in c′.
Proof. Since prpi[i].phase changes only in lines 28 and 28 (case 1), the assumption that @c@n ∈ R :
(S(c, n) ∩ S(c@n, n)) = ∅ in any c′′ ∈ R implies that prpi[i] = n in any c′′ ∈ R that is after c′. The reason
is that line 28 indeed does not decrease prpi[i].phase (part (2) of Claim 3.9) and line 28 only decreases
prpi[i].phase when assigning 0 (cf. case 0 of the function increment()). However, the latter cannot occur
for any pi ∈ R that is an active participant inR and for which prpi[i] = n holds in c′ (part (3) of Claim 3.9).2
Claim 3.11 For every system state c′′ ∈ R, it holds that prpi[i] = n.
Proof. Since prpi[i] = n holds in c (Claim 3.9), since prpi[i].phase is non-decreasing during step a
(Claim 3.10), since n is lexically greater or equal than any other notification in any system state of R
(Claim 3.9) and by this proof’s assumption that @c@n ∈ R : (S(c, n) ∩ S(c@n, n)) = ∅ holds, it is true that
prpi[i] = n holds in every system state c
′′ ∈ R. 2
Claim 3.12 The following sequence of invariants is true.
(1) Suppose that prpi[i] = n holds in every system state c′ ∈ R. Eventually the system reaches a state
c′′ ∈ R, such that for any pj ∈ P that is an active participant in R, it holds that prpj [i] = n and
FDj [i] = FDi. Moreover, prpj [j] = n and FDj [j] = FDi in c
′′ eventually.
(2) Suppose that invariant (1) holds in every system state c′ ∈ R. Eventually the system reaches a state
c′′ ∈ R, such that for any pi ∈ P that is an active participant in R, it holds that echoi[j].prp = n,
echoi[j].part = FDi[i].part and prpi[j] = n in c
′′.
(3) Suppose that invariants (1) and (2) hold in every system state c ∈ R. Eventually the system reaches a
state c′′ ∈ R, such that for any pi ∈ P that is an active participant in R, it holds that alli[i] = true in c′′.
(4) Suppose that invariants (1), (2) and (3) hold in every system state c′ ∈ R. Eventually the system reaches
a state c′′ ∈ R, such that for any pj ∈ P that is an active participant in R, it holds that allj [i] = true in
c′′.
(5) Suppose that invariants (1) to (4) hold in every system state c′ ∈ R. Eventually the system reaches
a state c′′ ∈ R, such that for any pj ∈ P that is an active participant in R, it holds that echoi[j] =
(FDi[i].part, prpi[i], alli[i]) in c
′′.
(6) Suppose that invariants (1) to (5) hold in every system state c′ ∈ R. Eventually the system reaches a
state c′′ ∈ R, such that for any pj ∈ P that is an active participant in R, it holds that pi ∈ allSeenj in c′′.
(7) Suppose that invariants (1) to (6) hold in every system state c′ ∈ R. Eventually the system reaches
a state c′′ ∈ R, such that for all pi ∈ P that is an active participant in R, it holds that the if-statement
condition of line 28 holds in c′′.
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Proof. We prove items (1) to (7).
(1) Since pi repeatedly sends message mi,j to every active processor pj ∈ FDi[j] (line 29), where mi,j =
〈•, prp = n, •〉, message mi,j arrives eventually to pj (line 8 and the fair communication assumption,
Section 2). This causes pj to store n in prpj [i] (at least) as long as prpi[j] = n, i.e., in every system state
c′′ that follows mi,j arrival to pj . For the case of n.phase = 1, we have that prpj [j] = n (Claim 3.10 and
line 28 (case 1) as well as the fact that n has the greatest lexicographic value in every c′ ∈ R, cf. part (2)
Claim 3.9). The same arguments as above imply that FDj [i] = FDi. Moreover, FDj [j] = FDi is implied by
the assumption that R is admissible with respect to the participant sets.
We show that prpj [j] = n for any n.phase ∈ {0, 1, 2}. By the assumptions made in the beginning
of the proof of this lemma, we do not need to consider the case of n.phase = 0. Thus, we start by
considering the case of n.phase = 1, we have that prpj [j] = n (Claim 3.10 and line 28 (case 1) as
well as the fact that n has the greatest lexicographic value in every c′ ∈ R, cf. part (2) Claim 3.9).
We now turn to consider the case of n.phase = 2. I.e., while keeping in mind that prpj [i] = n,
we need to show that prpj [j] = n. We do that by showing that whenever prpj [j] 6= prpj [i], the if-
statement condition of line 25 holds for any value of prpj [j].phase ∈ {0, 1, 2} and we focus on the case
of ((prpj [j].set 6= prpj [i].set) ∧ (prpj [j].phase = prpj [i].phase = 2)). Note that by showing that the
if-statement condition of line 25 does hold in c′′, we have reached a contradiction (part (1) of Claim 3.9’s
statement). For the case of prpj [j].phase ∈ {0, 1}, the if-statement condition of line 25 holds in c′′ be-
cause prpj [j] 6= prpj [i] implies allj [j] = false (line 28) and the condition |degreej(j) − degreej(i)| > 1
(line 25 does hold due to the fact that degreej(j) ≤ 2 and degreej(i) ≥ 4). Moreover, for the case of
((prpj [j].set 6= prpj [i].set) ∧ (prpj [j].phase = prpj [i].phase = 2)), the condition (|notifSeti| > 1)
(line 25) does not hold, because {prpj [j].set, prpj [i].set} ⊆ notifSet and |{prpj [i].set, prpj [j].set}| = 2,
where notifSet = {prpj [k].set : ∃pk ∈ FDj [j] : prpj [i] = 〈2, •〉}pk∈FDj [j].
(2) By similar arguments to the ones that show the arrival of mi,j in part (1) of this proof, processor pj
repeatedly sends the message mj,i = 〈•, prp = n, •, echo = (•, n, •)〉 to pi, which indefinitely stores n in
prpi[j] and echoi[j] (line 8). The same arguments as above imply that echoi[j].part = FDi[i].part.
(3) The system reaches a state in which the invariants of parts (1) and (2) hold for every pk ∈ FDi[i]. In that
system state, it holds that prpi[i] = n (this claim assumption), as well as the fact that echoi[j].prp = n and
prpi[j] = n (part (2) of this proof for showing that prpj [j] = n eventually and then using part (1) for showing
that FDi[j] = FDj [j] and prpi[j] = n). In other words, (∀pk ∈ FD[i].part : (echoNoAll(k) ∧ same(k))
(cf. line 28). Let us look at the first step after that state in which processor pi executes the do forever loop
(lines 8 to 29). Immediately after that step, the system reaches a state in which alli[i] = true holds (line 28).
(4) By similar arguments that appear in parts (1) and (2) of this proof, processor pi sends repeatedly the
message mi,j = 〈•, prp = n, all = true, •)〉 to processor pj . Once message mi,j arrives eventually to pj
(line 8 and the fair communication assumption, Section 2), processor pj stores true in allj [i] (as well as the
notification n in prpj [i]). This holds for every system state c
′′ that follows mi,j’s arrival to pj .
(5) By similar arguments that appear in parts (1) and (2) of this proof, processor pj sends repeatedly the
message mi,j = 〈•, prp = n, all = true, echo = (FDi[i].part, n, true)〉 to processor pi. Once message
mj,i arrives eventually to pi (line 8 and the fair communication assumption, Section 2), processor pi stores
(n, true) in echoi[j]. This holds for every system state c′′ that follows mj,i’s arrival to pj .
(6) We show that, once the invariants of parts (1) to (5) of this proof hold, the for-each condition of line 28
holds as well. Moreover, we show that assuming, towards a contradiction, that pi /∈ allSeenj implies that
there is a step in R that includes a call to configSet(⊥) (line 25), which is false according to part (1)
of Claim 3.9’s statement. By showing both the necessity and sufficiency conditions, we can conclude that
the assertion of this part in the claim even thought in Algorithm 3.1 processors pi and pj do not exchange
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information about allSeenj in order to validate that the set allSeenj includes pi.
The for-each condition of line 28 condition requires that for any pj ∈ FDi[i].part to have
(echoNoAll(j) ∧ same(j)), where the index k is substituted here with j. The following is true: prpi[j] =
prpi[i]∧FDi[j].part = FDi[i].part∧echoi[j].part = FDi[i].part (part (1) of this proof and the assumption
that R is admissible with respect to participant sets), echoi[j].prp = prpi[i] (part (5) of this proof), and
alli[j] = true (part (1) of this proof and then apply (4) for the case of prpj [i] = n).
We now turn to show that pj /∈ allSeeni implies that there is a step in R that includes a call to
configSet(⊥) (line 25). By the assumptions made in the beginning of the proof of this lemma, we do
not need to consider the case of n.phase = 0. Note that for n.phase = x ∈ {1, 2} and pi /∈ allSeenj , when
the following condition holds (∃pi ∈ FDj [j] : ((prpj [j].phase = x)∧ (prp[k].phase = (x+ 1)(mod 3))∧
(pi /∈ allSeenj))), the condition (pi /∈ allSeenj) implies that the if-statement condition of line 25 holds in
c′′, and this contradicts part (1) of Claim 3.9’s statement. Thus, pi ∈ allSeenj in c′′.
(7) Recall that part (5) of this proof says that echoi[j] = (•, n, true). By taking prpj [j] = n from part (1)
and applying it to the results of parts (1) to (6), we get that pj ∈ allSeeni holds eventually, because this
is true for every pair of processors pi, pj ∈ P that are active participants in R. Let us consider a system
state in which invariants (1) to (6) hold for any such pair of active participants pi and pj . This implies that
allSeeni() holds (by the fact that part (4) eventually implies that ∀pk ∈ FDi[i] : pk ∈ allSeeni). Therefore,
the if-statement condition of line 28 holds (by this lemma’s assumption that R is admissible with respect to
the participant sets and part (4) of this proof that shows ∀pk ∈ FDj [i] : allj [k] = true). 2
Claim 3.13 shows a contradiction to the assumption made in the beginning of the proof of Lemma 3.8.
This contradiction completes the proof of this lemma.
Claim 3.13 ∃ c∃n ∈ R in which S(c@n, n) = ∅.
Proof. Part (7) of Claim 3.12 says that the if-statement condition of line 28 holds in c′′ ∈ R eventually.
Let ai a step that immediately follows c′′ and in which pi executes the do forever loop (line 8 to 29). Note
that the case of n.phase ∈ {0} contradicts this lemma’s assumption that c@n ∈ R in which S(c@n, n) = ∅.
Suppose that n.phase ∈ {1} in c′′. The step ai includes an execution of line 28 that increases the lexical
value of n (contradicting part (2) of Claim 3.9). Suppose that n.phase ∈ {2} in c′′. The step ai includes an
execution of line 28 that changes n’s value to 〈0,⊥〉. Claim 3.12 implies that this holds for any pi ∈ P that
is an active participant in R. This is a contradiction with the assumption made in the beginning of the proof
of this lemma, i.e., ∃ c@n ∈ R in which S(c@n, n) = ∅. 2
This completes the proof of Lemma 3.8. 2
Algorithm 3.1 is self-stabilizing
Let ai ∈ R be a step in which processor pi calls the function estab(set) (line 8), and in which the if-statement
condition (noReco() ∧ (set /∈ {config[i], ∅})) does hold in the system state that immediately precedes ai.
We say that ai is an effective (configuration establishment) step in R. Similarly, we consider ai ∈ R to be a
step in which processor pi calls the function participate() (line 8), and in which the if-statement condition
noReco() does hold in the system state that immediately precedes ai. Let R = R′ ◦ RVNER ◦ R′′′ be an
execution that does include explicit (delicate) replacements, where R′ and R′′′ are a prefix, and respectively,
a suffix of R. Let us consider RVNER, which is a part of execution R. We say that RVNER virtually does
not include explicit (delicate) replacements (VNER) when for any step a ∈ RVNER that includes a call the
function estab(set) (line 8) or participate() (line 8) is ineffective. Given a system state c ∈ R, we say that
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c includes no notification if none of its active processors stores a notification and there are no notifications
in transit between any two active processors.
Lemma 3.14 (Eventually there is an VNER part) Let R be an execution of Algorithm 3.1 (which may
include explicit delicate replacements). Eventually the system reaches a state (1) c ∈ R after which an
VNER part, RVNER, starts. Moreover, after that, the system reaches eventually a state (2) cgoodNtf ∈ RVNER :
NA(cgoodNtf) = ∅ that has either (2.1) no notification or (2.2) at most one notification in the system and this
notification becomes the system quorum eventually (after reaching a state in which invariants (1) to (7) of
Claim 3.12 hold in cgoodNtf).
Proof. Note that the proof of part (1) is done whenever R has a suffix R′ in which no processor takes a step
that includes a call to the function estab(set) (line 8). Let us suppose that suffix R′ exists and show that part
(2.1) is true. The reason is that R′ satisfies the conditions of Lemma 3.8, which implies that eventually R′
reaches cgoodNtf. This is because Lemma 3.8 says that the lexical largest notification is removed eventually
from the system. Once that happen, either the system reaches cgoodNtf, or we can look at the suffix R′′ that
starts after that removal (of that lexical largest notification) and then we apply Lemma 3.8 again. Since R′′
does not include steps with a call to the function estab(set), no new notifications are “added” to the system,
and we can continue to apply Lemma 3.8 to the suffix of R′′ until the system includes no notifications, i.e.,
it reaches cgoodNtf.
For the complementary case, we show that R includes an RVNER part, i.e., part (1) of this proof. We
consider the different cases of the phase of the notification with the maximal lexical value. We show that
notification must reach the phase value of 2 and then leaves the system eventually. For this case, we show
that parts (1) and (2.1) of this lemma hold.
Let us consider the case in which R includes an unbounded number of steps in which active processors
call the function estab(set) (line 8). (Note that this is the complementary case to the first part of this proof
because here R′ does not exists.) Let S = {set : ai ∈ R includes a step that calls estab(set)}. (Note that
the case of S = ∅ is just another way to say that there are no effective steps inR and thusR′ exists.) Suppose
that S 6= ∅ and let n = 〈•, set〉 be a notification with the largest lexical value in R, where set ∈ S. (Note
that the proof needs not consider the case of n = 〈0, set〉, see line 8.)
In order to complete the proof of parts (1) and (2) for the complementary case, we show that, for any
choice of phase, it cannot be that n = 〈phase, set〉 and execution R does not have an VNER part, RVNER.
We do that by showing that the system reaches eventually a state c in which noReco() (line 8) returns false
for any active processor, pi ∈ P . Moreover, c marks the beginning of RVNER for which we show in part (2)
of the proof that cgoodNtf ∈ RVNER follows.
Suppose that n = 〈1, set〉. This part of the proof considers two cases. One in which n is a proposal that
never leaves the system and the another case in which it does leave eventually.
• Suppose that n never leaves the system. Suppose, towards a contradiction, that (i) n never leaves the
system and yet (ii) the system never reaches RVNER. By the same arguments that appear in the proof of part
(1) in Claim 3.12 we get that invariant prpi[j] = n holds, where pi, pj ∈ P are any two active processors.
Thus, noReco() (line 8) returns false for any active processor, pi ∈ P , and the system reaches RVNER’s first
configuration, c. Thus, a contradiction because the assumption that (i) and (ii) can hold together is false.
• Suppose that n does leave the system. We note that the case in which n leaves the system eventually contra-
dicts our assumption that n has the highest lexical values in S. The reason is that only active processors can
make a notification leave the system and they do so by changing their values in lines 28 to 28 (Claim 3.10).
But then, for the case of n = 〈1, set〉, the lexical value of n increases when Algorithm 3.1 takes such a step.
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We note that there is no need to show part (2) of this lemma for the above two cases, because none of
them is possible.
Suppose that n = 〈2, set〉. Similar to the previous case, we consider both the case in which n is a proposal
that never leaves the system and the other case in which it does leave eventually.
• Suppose that n never leaves the system. As in the proof of the first case of n = 〈1, set〉 and in which n
never leaves the system, we can use the same arguments as in the proof of part (1) of Claim 3.12 for showing
that invariant prpi[j] = n holds, where pi, pj ∈ P are any two active processors. Thus, noReco() (line 8)
returns false for any active processor, pi ∈ P , and the system reaches RVNER’s first configuration, c. Note
that once the system enters the VNER part of the execution, RVNER, we can use similar arguments to the
ones used in the proof of Lemma 3.8 to show that the system removes n. Thus, a contradiction with our
assumption (of this case) that n never leaves the system. Moreover, there is no need to prove part (2) of this
lemma (for this impossible case).
• Suppose that n does leave the system. We show that the only possible case is that n = 〈2, set〉 does leave
the system. Let us consider the set S′ = NA(cstart) of notifications that were present in R’s starting state,
cstart. We note that |S′| ∈ O(cap · n2), where cap is the bound on the link capacity (Section 2). Thus, even
though the number of notifications in S is unbounded, the number of the notifications in S′ is bounded.
Since this case assumes that n eventually leaves the system, and all other cases above are impossible, it
must be the case that R has a suffix R′′ that starts in a system state c′′ : NA(c′′) ∩ S′ 6= ∅ the encodes no
notification that appeared in R’s starting state. This can be shown by induction on |S′|. Moreover, the proof
can consider the case in which a given notification n = 〈•, set〉 : set ∈ S′ leaves the system and then returns
via a call to estab() (line 8). This is done by letting the proof to decorate the notification sets in R’s starting
system state, say, using the color ‘red’. Moreover, each set in a notification that is the result of a call to
estab(set) (line 8) also has decoration, but this time with another color, say ‘blue’.
Let n′, n′′ ∈ S \ S′ be two notifications (with decorated sets) that become present in R but they are not
present inR’s starting state. The only way in which n′ = 〈1, •〉 can become present in the system is via a step
a1 ∈ R that calls estab(set) (line 8). Moreover, the only way that n′′ = 〈2, •〉 can become present in R is via
step a2 ∈ R that changes n′ to n′′ = 〈2, set〉 (lines 28 to 28), such that ∃n′ ∈ S \ S′ : n′.set = n′′.set. Note
that after step a1, other steps a0 ∈ R occur in which n′′ disappears from the system (lines 28 to 28). This
sequence of steps between a2 and a0 and the system state that immediately precedes them are depicted by
invariants (1) to (7) of Claim 3.12 since these invariants hold in these states. Thus, c ∈ R holds immediately
before a2 and R must include an RVNER part, because invariant (1) holds eventually in R. Moreover,
invariants (1) to (7) of Claim 3.12 imply that n′′ is the only notification in the system, which eventually
becomes the quorum configuration after all steps a0 are taken. Thus, part (2) of this lemma is shown. 2
Theorem 3.15 demonstrates the eventual absence of stale information, which implies that Algorithm 3.1
convergences eventually, i.e., it is practically-stabilizing.
Theorem 3.15 (Convergence) Let R be an admissible execution of Algorithm 3.1. Eventually the system
reaches a state c ∈ R in which the invariants of no type-1, type-2, type-3 and type-4 stale information hold
thereafter.
Proof. Claim 3.1 shows that there is no type-1 stale information eventually. Lemma 3.2 shows that there
is no type-2 stale information eventually. Lemmas 3.8 and 3.14 say that the system either reaches a state
in which there are no notifications or there is at most one notification (for which invariants (1) to (7) of
Claim 3.12 hold) that later becomes the system configuration. Note that both cases imply that there is no
type-3 stale information eventually. Claims 3.7 shows that there is no type-4 stale information eventually. 2
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Theorem 3.16 (Closure) Let R be an execution of Algorithm 3.1. Suppose that execution R starts from a
system state that includes no stale information. (1) for any system state c ∈ R, it holds that c includes no
stale information. Suppose that the step that immediately follows c includes a call to estab(). (2) The only
way that set becomes a notification is via a call to estab(set) (line 8) and the only way that a processor
becomes a participant is via a call to participate() (line 8). (3) The presence of notifications in R implies
that one of them replaces the system configuration eventually.
Proof. The proof essentially follows from established results above.
Part (1). Since there is no stale information in the system state that immediately proceeds c, there is no
stale information in c. This follows from a close investigation of the lines that can change the system state in
a way that might introduce stale information; the most relevant lines are the ones that deal with notifications
(lines 28 and 28) and new participants (line 8). Thus, the proof is completed via parts (2) and (3).
Part (2). This is immediate from lines 8 and 8.
Part (3). It is not difficult to see that R includes an RVNER part (Lemma 3.14, Part (1)). Then, the proof
completes by applying part (7) of Claim 3.12 twice: Once for showing the selection of a single notification
that has phase 2, and the second time for showing that the selected notification replaces the configuration. 2
3.2 Reconfiguration Management
The Reconfiguration Management recMA layer shown in Algorithm 3.2 bears the weight of initiating or
triggering a reconfiguration when (i) the configuration majority has been lost, or (ii) when the prediction
function evalConf() indicates to a majority of members that a reconfiguration is needed to preserve the
configuration. To trigger a reconfiguration, Algorithm 3.2 uses the estab(set) interface with the recSA
layer. In this perspective, the two algorithms display their modularity as to their workings. Namely, recMA
controls when a reconfiguration should take place, but the reconfiguration replacement process is left to
recSA, which will install a new configuration also trying to satisfy recMA’s proposal of the new con-
figuration’s set. Several processors may trigger reconfiguration simultaneously, but by the correctness of
Algorithm 3.1 this does not affect the delicate reconfiguration, and by the correctness of Algorithm 3.2,
each processor can only trigger once when this is needed.
In spite of using majorities, the algorithm is generalizable to other (more complex) quorum systems,
while the prediction function evalConf() can be either very simple, e.g., asking for reconfiguration once
1/4th of the members are not trusted, or more complex, based on application criteria or network considera-
tions. More elaborate methods may also be used to define the set of processors that Algorithm 3.2 proposes
as the new configuration. Our current implementation, aiming at simplicity of presentation, defines the set
of trusted participants of the proposer as the proposed set for the new configuration.
3.2.1 Algorithm Description
Preserving a majority. The algorithm strives to ensure that a majority of the configuration is active.
Although majority is a special case of a quorum, the solution in extensible to host other quorum systems that
can be built on top of the config set, in which case, the algorithm aims at keeping a robust quorum system
where robustness criteria are subject to the system’s dynamics and application requirements. In this vein, the
presented algorithm employs a configuration evaluation function evalConf() used as a black box, which
predicts the quality of the current config and advises any participant whether a reconfiguration of config
needs to take place. Given that local information is possibly inaccurate, we prevent unilateral reconfiguration
requests –that may be the result of inaccurate failure detection– by demanding that a processor must first be
informed of a majority of processors in the current config that also require a reconfiguration (lines 16–18).
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Algorithm 3.2: Self-stabilizing Reconfiguration Management; code for processor pi
1 Interfaces: evalConf() returns True/False on whether a reconfiguration is required or not by using some (possibly
application-based) prediction function. The rest of the interfaces are specified in Algorithm 3.1. noReco() returns True if a
reconfiguration is not taking place, or False otherwise. estab(set) initiates the creation of a new configuration based on the
set. getConfig() returns the current local configuration.
2 Variables: needReconf [ ] is an array of size at most N , composed of booleans {True,False}, where needReconfi[j]
holds the last value of needReconfj [j] that pi received from pj as a result of exchange (lines 19 and 20) and
needReconf is an alias to needReconfi[i] i.e., of pi’s last reading of evalConf(). Similarly, noMaji[ ] is an array of
booleans of size at most N on whether some trusted processor of pi detects a majority of members that are active per the
reading of line 12. noMaji[j] (for i 6= j) holds the last value of noMajj [j] that pi received from pj . Finally
prevConfig holds pi’s believed previous config.
3 Macros:
4 core() =
⋂
pj∈FDi[i].part FD[j].part;
5 flushF lags() : foreach pj ∈ FD[i] do needReconf [j]← (noMaj[j]← False) Do forever begin
6 if pi ∈ FD[i].part then
7 curConf = getConfig();
8 needReconf [i]← (noMaj[i]← False);
9 if prevConfig 6∈ {curConf,⊥} then flushF lags()
10 if noReco() = True then
11 prevConfig← curConf ;
12 if |{pj ∈ curConf ∩ FD[i]}| < ( |curConf |2 + 1) then noMaj[i]← True if (noMaj[i] = True) ∧
(|core()| > 1) ∧ (∀pk ∈ core() : noMaj[k] = True) then
13 estab(FD[i].part);
14 flushF lags();
15
16 else if (needReconf [i]← evalConf(curConf)) ∧
|{pj ∈ curConf ∩ FD[i] : needReconf [j] = True}| > |curConf |2 then
17 estab(FD[i].part);
18 flushF lags();
19 foreach pj ∈ FD[i].part do send(〈noMaj[i], needReconf [i]〉)
20 Upon receive m from pj do if pi ∈ FD[i].part then 〈noMaj[j], needReconf [j]〉 ← m
Majority failure. On the other hand, we ensure liveness by handling the case were either the prediction
function does not manage to sustain a majority, or an initial arbitrary state lacks a majority but there are no
config inconsistencies that can trigger a delicate reconfiguration (via the estab() interface). Lines 12–14
tackle this case by defining the core of a processor pi to be the intersection of the failure detector readings
that pi has for the processors in its own failure detector, i.e., ∩pj∈FDi[i]FDi[j]. If this local core agrees that
there is no majority, i.e. that noMaj = True, then pi can request a new config. As a liveness condition
to avoid triggering a new config due to FD inconsistencies when there actually exists a majority of active
configuration members, we place the majority-supportive core assumption on the failure detectors, as seen
in Definition 3.2 below. Simply put, the assumption requires that if a majority of the current configuration
is active, then the core of every processor pt that is a participant, contains at least one processor ps with a
failure detector supporting that a majority of config is trusted. Furthermore, pt has knowledge that ps can
detect a majority of trusted members.
Detailed description. The algorithm is essentially executed only by participants as the condition of
line 6 suggests. Line 7 reads the current configuration, while line 8 initiates the local noMaji[i] and
needReconfi[i] variables to False. If a change from the previous configuration has taken place, the ar-
rays noMaj[ ] and needReconf [ ] are reset to False (line 9). The algorithm proceeds to evaluate whether
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a reconfiguration is required by first checking whether a reconfiguration is already taking place (line 10)
through the noReco() interface of recSA. If this is not the case, then it checks whether it can see a trusted
majority of configuration members, and updates the local noMaji[i] boolean accordingly (line 12). If
noMaji[i] = True, i.e., no majority of members is active, and line 12 finds that all the processors in its core
also fail to find a majority of members, then pi can trigger reconfiguration using estab() with the current
local set of participants as the proposed new config set (lines 13–14). The needReconfi[ ] and noMaji[ ]
arrays are again reset to False to prevent other processors that will receive these to trigger. Line 16 checks
whether the prediction function evalConfig() suggests a reconfiguration, and if a majority of members
appears to agree on this, then the triggering proceeds as above. Participants continuously exchange their
noMaj and needReconf variables (lines 19–20).
3.2.2 Correctness
The Reconfiguration Management algorithm is responsible for triggering a reconfiguration when either
a majority of the members crash or whenever the (application-based) config evaluation mechanism
evalConfig() suggests to a members’ majority that a reconfiguration is required. The correctness proof
ensures that, given the assumption of majority-supportive core holds, Algorithm 3.2 can converge from a
transient initial state to a safe state, namely, that after recMA has triggered a reconfiguration, it will never
trigger a new one before the previous one is completed and only if a new event makes it necessary.
Terminology. We use the term steady config state to indicate a system state in an execution were a
config has been installed by Algorithm 3.1 at least once, and the system state is conflict-free. A legal
execution R for Algorithm 3.2, refers to an execution that converges to a steady config state. Moreover,
a reconfiguration in R takes place only when a majority of the configuration members fails, or when a
majority of the members require a reconfiguration. The system remains conflict-free and moves to a new
steady config state with a new configuration.
Definition 3.2 (Majority-supportive core) Consider a steady config state in an execution R where the
majority of members of the established config never crashes. The majority-supportive core assumption
requires that every participant pi with a local core ∩pj∈FDi[i]FDi[j] containing more than one processor,
must have a core with at least one active participant pr whose failure detector trusts a majority of the
config, and for such a processor noMaji[r] = False throughout R.
Remark 1 We say that Algorithm 3.1 is triggered when a reconfiguration is initialized. By Algorithm 3.2,
the only way that Algorithm 3.2 can cause a triggering of Algorithm 3.1 is through a call to the estab()
interface with Algorithm 3.1 on lines 13 and 17.
Lemma 3.17 Starting from an arbitrary initial state in an execution R, where stale information exists,
Algorithm 3.2 converges to a steady config state where local stale information are removed.
Proof. Consider a processor pi with an arbitrary initial local state where stale information exists (1) in the
program counter, (2) in noMaji[•] and needReconfi[•] and (3) in prevConf .
Case 1 – Stale information may initiate the algorithm in a line other than the first of the pseudocode. If
pi’s program counter starts after line 10 and if a reconfiguration is taking place, then Algorithm 3.2 may
force a second reconfiguration while Algorithm 3.1 is already reconfiguring. The counter for example could
start on lines 13 and 17. This would force a brute reconfiguration. This triggering cannot be prevented in
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such a transient state, but we note that any subsequent iteration of the algorithm is prevented from accessing
estab() lines (as in Remark 1) before the reconfiguration is finished.
Case 2 – We note that after a triggering as the one described above, the fields of arrays noMaji[•] and
needReconfi[•] are set to False. Moreover, in every iteration noMaji[i] and needReconfi[i] are set to
False. During a reconfiguration these values are propagated to other processors and pi receives their corre-
sponding values. Therefore, pi must eventually receive noMajj [j] (needReconfj [j]) from some participant
pj , and overwrite any transient values. Lemma 3.18 bounds the number of reconfigurations that may be trig-
gered by corruption that is not local, i.e., that emerges from corrupt noMaj (needReconf ) values that
arrive from the communication links.
Case 3 – We anticipate that any reconfiguration returns a different configuration than the previous one. In
a transient state though, the previous configuration (prevConfig) and the current configuration curConf
may coincide. This ignores the check of line 9 that sets noMaji[•] and needReconfi[•] to False upon
the detection of a reconfiguration change. This forms a source of a potential unneeded reconfiguration.
Nevertheless, prepConfig receives the most recent configuration value on every iteration of line 11 and
thus the above may only take place once throughout R per processor.
Eliminating these sources of corruption, we reach a steady config state without local stale information. 2
Lemma 3.18 Consider a steady config state c in an execution R where the majority-supportive core as-
sumption holds throughout, the majority of config processors never crash and there is never a majority of
members supporting evalConf() = True. There is a bounded number of triggerings of the Algorithm 3.1
that are a result of stale information, namely O(N2cap).
Proof. By Remark 1, the only way that the algorithm may interrupt a steady config state, is by reaching
lines 13 and 17 that have a call to estab(). We assume that some member pt ∈ config has triggered
Algorithm 3.1 at some system state ct ∈ R, and we examine whether and when this state is attainable from
c. We note that in a complete iteration of Algorithm 3.2, pt must have no reconfiguration taking place while
triggering, since this is a condition to reach the above mentioned lines imposed by line 10. We first prove
that if there is a triggering it must be due to initial corrupt information and then argue that this can take place
a bounded number of times.
Case 1 – The reconfiguration was initiated by line 13. This implies that the condition of line 12 is
satisfied, i.e., at some system state ct ∈ R, pt has local information that satisfies (noMajt[t] = True)
∧ (|coret()| > 1) ∧ (∀pk ∈ coret() : noMajt[k] = True). Condition (noMajt[t] = True) may be true
locally for pt, only due to failure detector inaccuracy, because, by the lemma, the majority of processors in
the config never fails throughout R. Condition |coret()| > 1 suggests that pt has at least two participant
processors in its core (without requiring pt ∈ coret()). By the majority-supportive core assumption and
the above, we are guaranteed that ∃ps ∈ coret() : |FDs[s] ∩ configs[s]| > |configs[s]|2 throughout R and
noMajt[s] = True ⇐⇒ noMajs[s] = True. But in this case, noMajs[s] = False and noMajt[s] = True
which contradicts the majority supportive assumption. We thus reach to the result.
Note that noMajt[s] = True can reside in pt’s local state or in the communication links that may
carry stale information. Because of the boundedness of our system, we can have one instance of corrupt
noMajt[s] = True in pt’s local state, and cap instances in the communication link. I.e., such information
may cause a maximum of 1+cap ·N triggerings per processor. Any processor that enters the system cannot
introduce corrupt information to the system due to the data-links protocols and the joining mechanism. Thus
majority supportive assumption is also attainable even when starting from arbitrary states.
Case 2 – The reconfiguration procedure was triggered by line 16. This implies that for pt, both con-
ditions were true, i.e., (a) (needReconft ← evalConft(configt)) and (b) |{pj ∈ configt ∩ FDt :
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needReconft[j] = True}| > |configt|2 . We note that the needReconft[t] variable is always set to False
upon the beginning of every iteration. Thus the local function evalConft() due to pt’s failure detector
and other application criteria explicitly suggested a reconfiguration in the specific iteration in which pt trig-
gered the reconfiguration. From the lemma, there is no majority of processors in the config that supports a
reconfiguration, even at the time when pt triggered the reconfiguration.
Thus needReconft[s] = True must reside in pt’s local state and in the communication links. We
can have one instance of corrupt needReconft[s] = True in pt’s local state, and cap instances in the
communication links. I.e. such information may cause a maximum of 1 + cap ·N triggerings per processor.
Note that after every such triggering, the source of triggering is eliminated by reseting needReconfig[ ]
to False (lines 9, 14 and 18). From this point onwards any processor that enters the system cannot by the
data-links and the joining mechanism introduce corrupt information to the system.
So the possible triggerings in the system attributed to stale information are confined to O(N2cap) and
by Algorithm 3.1 guarantees we always reach a steady config state. 2
Let csafe denote a safe system state where all possible sources of triggerings attributed to the arbitrary
initial state have been eliminated. We denote an execution starting from csafe as Rsafe.
Lemma 3.19 Consider an execution Rsafe where the majority-supportive core assumption holds through-
out, the majority of config processors never crash and there is never a majority of the config with local
evalConf() = True. This execution is composed of only steady config states.
Proof. By Lemma 3.18 there is a bounded number of triggerings due to initial arbitrary information. Given
that we have reached a safe system state, these triggerings do not occur. The last config change, has by
line 9 reset all the fields in noMaj[ ] and needReconf [ ] to False and this holds for all participants (even
if they are not members of the config). By our assumption a majority of processors does not crash. The
majority-supportive core assumption states that throughout Rsafe there exists at least one processor pi in the
core of pt that always has noMaji[i] = False and pt has noMajt[i] = False . Thus the condition of line 12
can never be true, and thus there is no iteration of the algorithm that can reach line 13. Similarly, since no
majority of processors in the config change to needReconf = True in this execution, and the local states
are exchanged continuously over the token-based data-link, line 17 cannot be true. Thus any system state in
R is a steady config state. 2
Lemma 3.20 Starting from an Rsafe execution, Algorithm 3.2 guarantees that if (1) a majority of config
members collapse or if (2) a majority of members require a reconfiguration as per the prediction function, a
reconfiguration takes place.
Proof. We consider the two cases separately.
Case 1 – If a majority of the members collapses, then based on the failure detector’s correctness, a non-
crashed participant pt will eventually stop including a majority of config members in its failure detector
and participants (FD.part) set. We remind that rejoins are not permitted. Since the majority-supporting
core assumption does not apply in this case, any processor in pt’s core must eventually reach to the same
conclusion as pt. Every such participating processor ps ∈ coret() propagates noMajs[s] = True in every
iteration. By the assumption that a packet sent infinitely often arrives infinitely often (the fair communication
assumption, Section 2), any processor such as pt must eventually collect a noMaj = True from every
member like ps core and thus enable a reconfiguration.
Case 2 – The arguments are similar to Case 1. The difference lies in that the processor pt must eventually
receive needReconfig = True from a majority of config members (rather than the local core processors)
before it moves to trigger a reconfiguration. 2
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Lemma 3.21 Starting from an Rsafe execution, any triggering of Algorithm 3.1 (lines 13 and 17) related
to a specific event (majority collapse or agreement of majority to change config), can only cause a one per
participant concurrent trigger. After the config has been established, no triggerings that relate to this event
take place.
Proof. We consider the two cases that can trigger a reconfiguration (Remark 1), and assume that pt is the first
processor to trigger estab(). Assume first that pt has called Algorithm 3.1 two consecutive times, without
a config being completely established between the two calls. Note that a processor can access estab() in
either of lines 13 or 17 but not both in a single iteration. A call to estab() initiates a reconfiguration and thus
any subsequent check of pt in line 10 returns False from pt’s recSA layer. Thus pt cannot access lines 13
or 17 until the reconfiguration has been completed. This implies that pt can never trigger for a second
time unless the new config has been established. Note that if pt triggers, another processor satisfying the
conditions of line 10 may trigger concurrently, but is also subject to the trigger-once limitation. On the other
hand, due to the exchange of information in Algorithm 3.1, when one processor triggers other processors
eventually find their proposals and join the reconfiguration. So not every single processor’s Reconfiguration
Management module needs to trigger. Convergence to a single config is guaranteed by Algorithm 3.1.
We conclude by indicating that lines 14 and 18 reset both arrays noMajt[ ] and needReconft[ ] im-
mediately after estab(). Thus the triggering data used for this event are not used again. Moreover, upon
configuration change, the same arrays are again set to False for the processors that have not triggered Al-
gorithm 3.1 themselves through Algorithm 3.2. We thus reach a new steady config state, and no more
triggerings can take place due to the same event that had caused the reconfiguration. 2
Theorem 3.22 Let R be an execution starting from an arbitrary system state. Algorithm 3.2 guarantees
that R eventually reaches an execution suffix which is a legal execution.
Proof. By Lemmas 3.17 and 3.18, we are guaranteed that we reach a safe system state csafe where stale
information from the arbitrary initial state cannot force a triggering of new config. This is the suffix Rsafe.
Lemma 3.19 ensures that after we have reached csafe, and until a new triggering takes place that is caused
by a loss of majority or a majority of the config deciding to reconfigure, the current config will not be
changed for any other reason. Lemma 3.21 guarantees that after a change, we return to a steady config
state. Hence, Rsafe is a legal execution. 2
3.3 Joining Mechanism
Every processor that wants to become a participant, uses the snap stabilizing data-link protocol (see Sec-
tion 2) so as to avoid introducing stale information after it establishes a connection with the system’s pro-
cessors. Algorithm 3.1 enables a joiner to obtain the agreed config when no reconfiguration is taking place.
Note that, in spite of having knowledge of this config, a processor should only be able to participate in the
computation if the application allows it. In order to sustain the self-stabilization property, it is also important
that a new processor initializes its application-related local variables to either default values or to the latest
values that a majority of the configuration members suggest. The joining protocol, Algorithm 3.3, illustrates
the above and introduces joiners to the system, but only as participants and not as config members.
The critical difference between a participant and a joiner is that the first is allowed to send configuration
information via the recSA layer, whereas the latter may only receive.
3.3.1 Algorithm description
The algorithm is executed by non-participants and participants alike.
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Algorithm 3.3: Self-stabilizing Joining Mechanism; code for processor pi
1 Interfaces. The algorithm uses following interfaces from Algorithm 3.1. noReco() returns True if a reconfiguration is not
taking place. participate() makes pi a participant. getConfig() returns the agreed configuration from Algorithm 3.1 or
⊥ if reconfiguration is taking place. The passQuery() interface to the application, returns a True/False in response to
granting a permission to a joining processor.
2 Variables. FD[] as defined in Algorithm 3.1. state[] is array of containing application states, where state[i] represents
pi’s local variables and state[j] the state that pi most recently received by pj . pass[] collects all the passes that pi receives
from configuration members.
3 Functions. resetV ars() initializes all variables related to the application based on default values. initV ars() initializes
all variables related to the application based on states exchanged with the configuration members.
4 procedure join() begin
5 foreach pj ∈ FD do pass[j]← False do forever begin
6 if pi 6∈ FD[i].part then
7 resetV ars();
8 repeat
9 let comConf = getConfig();
10 if noReco() ∧ (|{pj : pj ∈ comConf ∩ FD[i] ∧ pass[j] = True}| > |comConf |2 ) then
11 initV ars();
12 participate();
13 foreach pj ∈ FD[i] do send(“Join”)
14 until pi ∈ FD[i].part;
15 upon receive (“Join”) from pj ∈ FD \ FD[i].part do begin
16 if pi ∈ config ∧ noReco() = True then send(〈passQuery(), statei〉)
17 upon receive m = 〈pass, state〉 from pj ∈ FD do begin
18 if pi 6∈ FD[i].part then 〈pass[j], state[j]〉 ← m
The joiner’s side. Upon a call to the join() procedure, a joiner sets all the entries of its pass[ ] array to
False (line 5) and resets application-related variables to default values, (lines 7). The processor then enters
a do-forever loop, the contents of which it executes only while it is not a participant (line 6). A joiner
then enters a loop in which it tries to gather enough support from a majority of configuration members.
In every iteration, the joiner sends a “Join” request (line 13) and stores the True/False responses by any
configuration member pj in pass[j], along with the latest application state that pj has send. If a majority of
active members has granted a pass = True and there is no reconfiguration taking place, then participate()
is called to allow the joining processor to become a participant.
The participant’s side. A participant only executes the do–forever loop (line 5), but none of its contents
since it always fails the condition of line 6. Participants however respond to join requests (line 16) by
checking whether a joining processor has the correct configuration, and whether a reconfiguration is not
taking place, as well as if the application can accept a new processor. If the above are satisfied then the
participant sends a pass = True and its applications’ state, otherwise it responds with False.
3.3.2 Correctness
The term legal join initiation indicates a processor’s attempt to become a participant by initiating Algo-
rithm 3.3 on line 1, and not on any other line of the join() procedure. If the latter case occurred it would
indicate a corruption to the program counter.
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Lemma 3.23 Consider an arbitrary initial state in an execution R. There are up to N possible instances of
processors introducing corruption to the system.
Proof. Processors may be found with an uninitialized or falsely initialized local state due to a transient fault
in their program counter which allowed them to reach line 11 without a legal join initiation. In an arbitrary
initial state, any processor with stale information may manage to become a participant. There can be up to
N such processors, i.e., the maximal number of active processors. Nevertheless, a processor trying to access
the system after this, is forced to start the execution of join() from line 1.
2
Claim 3.24 Consider any processor pi performing a legal join initiation. In the existence of other par-
ticipants in the system, this processor never becomes a participant through the join() procedure during
reconfiguration.
Proof. We consider the situation where participants exist and reconfiguration is taking place, thus noReco()
is False. In order for pi to become a participant, it needs to gather a pass from at least a majority of the
configuration members. This can only happen if a configuration is in place, and if each of these members
is not reconfiguring. Thus if a pass is granted, it must be that during the execution more than a majority of
True passes have arrived at pi. Note that since the propagation of passes is continuous if a reconfiguration
starts, then passes can also be retracted. Finally, since getting a majority of passes can coincide with the
initialization of a reconfiguration, we note that due to asynchrony this processor is considered a participant
of the previous configuration, since it has full knowledge of the system’s state and is also known by the
previous configuration members. 2
Lemma 3.25 Consider an executionR where Lemma 3.24 holds, such that duringR, a processor p becomes
a participant. Then p cannot cause a reconfiguration, unless there exists a majority of the configuration set,
or if there is no majority of the config that requires a reconfiguration.
Proof. We assume that p enters the computation with a legal join initiation. If p triggers a reconfiguration
in the absence of the above two cases, then this implies that p has managed to become a participant while
carrying corrupt information which have triggered a reconfiguration either directly or indirectly (through
Algorithm 3.2). Corruption can either be local or in the communication links. Since the snap-stabilizing
data-link protocol runs before the processor calls join(), this removes data-link corruption for newly joining
participants. We turn to the case of a corrupt local state. By the legal join initiation assumption, p must have
reset its state on line 7. Before joining, the majority of members must acknowledge the latest state of p and
p initiates its variables to legal values. It is therefore impossible that p can become a participant while it
carries a corrupt state. Therefore, p cannot cause a reconfiguration. 2
Theorem 3.26 Consider an arbitrary initial state of an execution R of Algorithm 3.3. We eventually reach
an execution suffix in which every joining processor p will continue trying to join a participant if the applica-
tion allows it. Additionally, this new processor cannot trigger a delicate reconfiguration before becoming a
participant and cannot trigger a delicate reconfiguration without majority loss or majority agreement after
it becomes a participant.
Proof. By Lemma 3.23, we eventually reach an execution suffix where all joining processors enter the
computation with a legal join initiation. We assume that a reconfiguration is not taking place, that messages
sent infinitely often are eventually received infinitely often, and that the application interface invoked by
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the participating processors allows p to join. Then p will eventually have a failure detector including a
majority of member processors and will send its “Join” request to a majority (line 13). Since there is
no reconfiguration taking place, p must learn the current configuration from Algorithm 3.1, which should
agree with the config held by other processors. Thus each member must grant a pass to p by sending
True through line 16. Therefore, p will gather a majority supporting its entrance and will eventually satisfy
line 10. This allows it to reach line 12 and thus p becomes a participant. Notice that if the application
does not give permission of entry via passQuery(), then p cannot become a participant unless this changes,
but p will continue sending requests. Finally, Lemma 3.25 ensures that the new participant does not cause
perturbations to the current configuration, and hence the result. 2
4 Applications of the Reconfiguration Scheme
Using our self-stabilizing reconfiguration scheme, we present a collection of applications designed for more
static settings (with a known fixed set of crash-prone processors) and adapt them to be able to run on the
more dynamic setting that we describe here. We first present a general purpose labeling and counter scheme
(Sections 4.1 and 4.2) and then proceed to show how to build a self-stabilizing reconfigurable virtually
synchronous replicated state machine (Section 4.3).
4.1 Labeling Scheme and Algorithm
Many distributed applications assume access to an unbounded counter, e.g., to provide ballot numbers for
consensus in Paxos, tag numbers for distributed shared memory emulation or view identifiers for virtually
synchronous reliable multicast [11]. An unbounded counter implemented as a 64-bit integer, for example,
is practically inexhaustible when initiated at 0 for the lifetime of most known systems. Transient failures,
nevertheless, can immediately drive the counter (sequence number or seqn) to its maximal value (e.g., 264)
causing it to wrap. Recently, we extended an existing labeling and counter increment scheme to enable any
processor of a fixed processor set to increment a counter integer attached to an epoch label [11]. When the
counter is exhausted, a new maximal label is used with a non-exhausted seqn. We now adjust that solution
to benefit from our reconfiguration mechanism. In this scheme, configuration members are the ones that
run the labeling algorithm and maintain a globally maximal label and counter. The labeling and counter
increment algorithms consider every new configuration as a new instance of the corresponding algorithms
of [11]. To this end, Algorithm 4.1 is a wrapper of the self-stabilizing labeling algorithm of [11] that retains
the initial algorithm as a module (Algorithm 4.2) allowing it to cope with reconfiguration. We first provide
the labeling algorithm, and then extend labels to counters, presenting how counter increments take place.
4.1.1 Description of Algorithm 4.1
Outline. The algorithm is run only by configuration members. Each label is marked by its creator’s identifier
and any two labels are compared first as to their creator identifier and then as to a set of integers using the
operator ≺lb. Labels by the same processor can be incomparable. A processor that is aware of a set of
labels with its own identifier, can always create a greater label. The aim is for members to learn of any
valid label in the system and finally result to the globally greatest one, and to this end, members exchange
labels. We refer the reader to [11] for more details on the label structure. The algorithm ignores labels by
non-member creators by setting them to ⊥. If Algorithm 3.1 reports that a reconfiguration is taking place
(via noReco), no actions are taken. Upon the completion of a reconfiguration, every member’s local label
storage is rebuilt to reflect the new configuration set, and all the label queues are emptied. Newly joined
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Algorithm 4.1: Self-Stabilizing Labeling Algorithm for Reconfiguration; code for pi ∈ config
1 Variables: Let v be the size of the configuration config as returned by getConfig().
2 max[v] of label pairs 〈ml, cl〉: max[i] is pi’s largest label pair, max[j] refers to pj’s maxj [j] label pair that was last sent
to pi (canceled when max[•].cl 6= ⊥). storedLabels[v]: an array of queues of label pairs, where storedLabels[j] holds
the labels created by pj ∈ config. For pj ∈ (config \ {pi}), storedLabels[j]’s queue size is limited to (v +m) w.r.t.
label pairs, where m is the maximum number of label pairs that can be in transit in the system. The storedLabels[i]’s
queue size is limited to (v(v2 +m)) + v pairs.
3 Interfaces: noReco() returns False (from the reconfiguration module) when a reconfiguration is taking place, and True
otherwise. getConfig() returns the current configuration if one exists. labelReceiptAction() maintains the label arrays
by calling the receive function of Algorithm 4.2.
4 Operators: rebuild(v) rebuilds the storedLabels[] array of queues and max[] to have v entries. It also adjusts the queue
size for the new v. emptyAllQueues() clears all storedLabels[] queues. confChange() returns True if a
reconfiguration has taken place, and False otherwise, by comparing the current label structures with the result of
getConfig().
5 Macros:
6 cleanLP (x) = if (∃` ∈ x.〈ml, cl〉, pj 6∈ curConf) : `.lCreator = pj) then return 〈⊥,⊥〉 else return x;
7 function cleanMax() foreach pj ∈ curConf, ` ∈ max[j].〈ml, cl〉 : `.lCreator = pk 6∈ curConf do
max[j]← 〈⊥,⊥〉
8 do forever begin
9 if noReco() = True ∧ confChange() = True then
10 curConf = getConfig();
11 rebuild(|curConf |);
12 emptyAllQueues();
13 cleanMax();
14 labelReceiptAction(〈⊥,max[i], pi〉);
15 upon transmitReady(pk ∈ curConf \ {pi}) begin
16 if noReco() = True ∧ confChange() = False then
17 transmit(〈max[i],max[k]〉 ← 〈cleanLP (max[i]), cleanLP (max[k])〉)
18 upon receive(〈sentMax, lastSent〉) from pk ∈ curConf begin
19 if noReco() = True ∧ confChange() = False then
20 cleanMax();
21 〈sentMax, lastSent〉 = 〈cleanLP (sentMax), cleanLP (lastSent)〉;
22 labelReceiptAction(〈sentMax, lastSent, pk〉);
processors are assumed to join with initialized links and empty label structures and thus cannot introduce
corrupt information. If a reconfiguration is not reported, member p of the configuration periodically sends
and receives its locally maximal labels with all the other members. Whenever it sends or receives a new
label pair, it checks whether this has the identifier of one of the current members. The received label pairs
are passed to the receive function (Algorithm 4.2), which is exactly the same as the one in [11]. This always
returns a local maximal label either by some other member or by the caller itself. We underline that for
every configuration we can find a greatest label, but it cannot be guaranteed that the label of a configuration
will continue being the greatest in a following configuration.
Variables. Processor pi that belongs to a configuration config with v = |config|, has an array maxi[v],
where maxi[i] contains the local maximal label pi knows, and maxi[j] the last value that config mem-
ber pj has send. The array of label queues storedLabelsi[] holds a queue of size (v(v2 + m)) + v in
storedLabelsi[i] for labels concerning processor pi, and queues of size v + m for all other configuration
members in storedLabelsi[j].
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Algorithm 4.2: Self-Stabilizing Labeling Algorithm receipt action; code for pi ∈ config
1 Variables: For a configuration config with v = |config|
2 max[v] of 〈ml, cl〉: max[i] is pi’s largest label pair, max[j] refers to pj’s label pair (canceled when
max[j].cl 6= ⊥).
3 storedLabels[v]: an array of queues of the most-recently-used label pairs, where storedLabels[j] holds the
labels created by pj ∈ config. For pj ∈ (config \ {pi}), storedLabels[j]’s queue size is limited to (v + m)
w.r.t. label pairs, where m is the maximum number of label pairs that can be in transit in the system. The
storedLabels[i]’s queue size is limited to (v(v2 + m)) + v pairs. The operator add(`) adds lp to the front of
the queue, and emptyAllQueues() clears all storedLabels[] queues. We use lp.remove() for removing the
record lp ∈ storedLabels[]. Note that an element is brought to the queue front every time this element is
accessed in the queue.
4 nextLabel() creates a label that is greater than any other label in storedLabesi[i].
5 Notation: Let y and y′ be two records that include the field x. We denote y =x y′ ≡ (y.x = y′.x)
6 Macros:
7 legit(lp) = (lp = 〈•,⊥〉)
8 labels(lp) : return (storedLabels[lp.ml.lCreator])
9 double(j, lp) = (∃lp′ ∈ storedLabels[j] : ((lp 6= lp′) ∧ ((lp =ml lp′) ∨ (legit(lp) ∧ legit(lp′)))))
10 staleInfo() = (∃pj ∈ P, lp ∈ storedLabels[j] : (lp 6=lCreator j) ∨ double(j, lp))
11 recordDoesntExist(j) = (〈max[j].ml, •〉 /∈ labels(max[j]))
12 notgeq(j, lp) = if (∃lp′ ∈ storedLabels[j] : (lp′.ml 6lb lp.ml)) then return(lp′.ml) else return(⊥)
13 canceled(lp) = if (∃lp′ ∈ labels(lp) : ((lp′ =ml lp) ∧ ¬legit(lp′))) then return(lp′) else return(⊥)
14 needsUpdate(j) = (¬legit(max[j]) ∧ 〈max[j].ml,⊥〉 ∈ labels(max[j]))
15 legitLabels() = {max[j].ml : ∃pj ∈ P ∧ legit(max[j])}
16 useOwnLabel() = if (∃lp ∈ storedLabels[i] : legit(lp)) thenmax[i]← lp
else storedLabels[i].add(max[i]← 〈nextLabel(),⊥〉) // For every lp ∈ storedLabels[i], we
pass in nextLabel() both lp.ml and lp.cl.
17 function labelReceiptAction(〈sentMax, lastSent, pk〉) begin
18 max[k]← sentMax;
19 if ¬legit(lastSent) ∧max[i] =ml lastSent then max[i]← lastSent
20 if staleInfo() then storedLabels.emptyAllQueues()
21 foreach pj ∈ P : recordDoesntExist(j) do labels(max[j]).add(max[j])
22 foreach pj ∈ P, lp ∈ storedLabels[j] : (legit(lp) ∧ (notgeq(j, lp) 6= ⊥)) do lp.cl← notgeq(j, lp)
23 foreach pj ∈ P, lp ∈ labels(max[j]) : (¬legit(max[j])∧ (max[j] =ml lp)∧ legit(lp)) do lp← max[j]
24 foreach pj ∈ P, lp ∈ storedLabels[j] : double(j, lp) do lp.remove()
25 foreach pj ∈ P : (legit(max[j]) ∧ (canceled(max[j]) 6= ⊥)) do max[j]← canceled(max[j])
26 if legitLabels() 6= ∅ then max[i]← 〈max≺lb(legitLabels()),⊥〉
27 else useOwnLabel()
Interfaces and Operators. The noReco() interface of Algorithm 3.1 returns False when a reconfig-
uration is taking place, and True otherwise. It also returns the current configuration if one exists via
getConfig(). labelReceiptAction() maintains the label arrays by calling the receive function of Algo-
rithm 4.2. emptyAllQueues() clears all storedLabels[] queues. confChange() returns True if a recon-
figuration has taken place, and False otherwise, by comparing the current label structures with the result of
getConfig().
During reconfiguration. The conditions noReco() = True and confChange() = False of lines 6 and 16
prevent transition and reception of labels during reconfiguration and before the label structures have been
reset after reconfiguration has taken place.
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After reconfiguration. Lines 9–14 are only executed upon a completed reconfiguration. Line 10 gets
the new configuration from Algorithm 3.1, and line 11 uses rebuild(config) to adjust max[] array so that
it holds the entries of any processor that also belonged to the previous configuration, removing the ones
by old removed members and adding new fields for the labels of new config members. Line 13 removes
labels from the new max[] that were not created by configuration members. The effect is analogous for
storedLabels[], where v+m-sized label queues are added and removed to reflect the changes in the config
composition, but noting that v is now the cardinality of the new configuration set. These queues are emptied
by line 12. Finally, the processor finds a new local maximal label either from the ones that it has in max[],
or by creating a new one with its one creator identifier (line 14).
Label exchange and maintenance. If a reconfiguration is not taking place, then a member periodically
sends to every other configuration member pj its own local maximal label and the last label that pj sent for
the local maximal label. Note that messages from non-members are discarded before being sent, so they are
not propagated (lines 6–16).
Similarly when pi receives a message as the one described above, it cleans its max[] array and the re-
ceived two labels from non-member labels and passes them to the labelReceptionAction() (Algorithm 4.2).
The description of the inner workings of the labelReceptionAction() is given in great detail in [11]. As an
overview, it first stores pj’s value in maxi[j] and processes it along with the other label that was received
which reflected pi’s maximal label that was received most recently by pj . In general terms, it performs
housekeeping of labels in storedLabels[] and max[] such that only the greatest label per processor is con-
sidered before a local maximal label is chosen by pi.
4.1.2 Correctness
Outline. We first establish that after a full iteration, of Algorithm 4.2 every configuration member does not
sustain and does not introduce any label that has a creator identifier by a non-member. It is then possible
to map every configuration of an execution to an instance of the fixed-set labeling algorithm of [11] and
thus induce the correctness proof therein. This ensures that eventually a maximal label is found. Since
the algorithm is aware of configuration changes (that exist after reconfigurations), it can use this events to
achieve more efficient convergence for a configuration that follows a reconfiguration (in contrast to one that
is in place in an initial arbitrary state). We thus reach to the above bounds where N is an upper bound on
the system and thus a possible upper bound for the configuration size.
Note about participants that are not members. Algorithms 4.1 and 4.2 are run by processors that are
strictly members of the current configuration and only if a reconfiguration is not taking place. Members
send, receive and take into account only labels that come from and concern processors that are members.
In this perspective, it should not be possible for a non-member processor to add labels to the system in a
way that will affect the system. If a processor for any reason stops being a member after a configuration but
remains an active participant, then once reconfiguration takes place, the member processors stop considering
labels from this processor and void (set to 〈⊥,⊥〉) any label pair from this processor.
Lemma 4.1 Consider an arbitrary starting system state of an execution R where a configuration does not
change throughout R, a processor pi ∈ config reaches a local state where there are no labels from any
processor ps 6∈ config, immediately after the first iteration of Algorithm 4.1 that includes a receive event.
Moreover, a label by ps 6∈ config can never be introduced to the local state of pi at any point after the
configuration is established.
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Proof. Notice that while the configuration does not change because the reconfiguration module finds that this
configuration can serve the system, there could be corruption relating to the local variables of the labeling
algorithm. We first establish that at any point after a complete execution of lines 6–22, pi’s local state never
contains a label by a non-member ps. Assume for contradiction that such a label exists at some system state
after the execution of these lines. This label can exist either in (i) the max[] array or (ii) the storedLabels[]
array.
Member pi ∈ config acknowledges that ps 6∈ config, since the configuration is agreed and any incon-
sistency will cause a reconfiguration in Algorithm 3.1. We have already assumed for the purposes of the
proof that a reconfiguration does not happen throughout R. Labels arriving from ps cannot start a receive
event by the conditions line 6. If a label created by ps is received from some processor pj ∈ config then
this is set to ⊥ by line 21. So no incoming labels can enter the local state.
We now consider the system state immediately after line 22 returns from executing Algorithm 4.2.
Line 20 of Algorithm 4.1 guarantees that max[] is cleaned of labels that appear as created by ps. Assume
that a label by ps 6∈ config exists in the storedLabels[] structure. There are two cases depending on the
structure of the storedLabels[] array of queues.
Case 1 – Processor pi does not have an entry for ps in storedLabels[]. This must be true for a legal state,
since a member processor should only keep queues in storedLabelsi[] that relate to member processors. So
ps’s label must reside in a queue of storedLabelsi[] that is not intended for ps’s labels. In such a case since
ps 6∈ config, line 20 of Algorithm 4.2 will cause the flushing of the queues because staleInfo() = True.
Case 2 – Processor pi has an entry for ps 6∈ config in storedLabels[]. This is the result of transient fault
and implies that the label structures queues where not prepared for the new configuration. Nevertheless, in
a complete iteration of lines 6–20, confChange() of line 9 will return True because of this discrepancy
between config and the composition of the label structures. But this causes the algorithm to move to line 9
and so execute lines 10–13 thus emptying the storedLabels[] and cleaning max[] of ps-created labels.
Therefore, immediately after a receive is completed for Case 1 or after the execution of line 13 in Case 2,
there cannot be a label created by ps 6∈ config inside pi’s local state. Furthermore, we have established that
such incoming labels cannot enter pi’s state. Hence we reach to the result. It is evident that once pi’s state
is cleaned, it cannot transmit any such labels via line 16. 2
Lemma 4.2 Consider an executionR of Algorithm 4.1 where Lemma 4.1 holds and no reconfiguration takes
place throughout R. It holds that this instance of the problem of providing a self-stabilizing labeling scheme
in the dynamic setting can be reduced to the one of the problem of a fixed processor set self-stabilizing
labeling scheme problem, where the fixed set is the common configuration.
Proof. Note that the fixed-set version allows for processors from a specific non-changing set to crash but not
rejoin. We identify the agreed configuration set to this fixed set of possibly active processors. Processors of
the configuration may crash but may not rejoin. Algorithms 4.1 and 4.2 are run only by member processors.
As established by Lemma 4.1, labels can have the identifier of any of the processors in this set but of no
other processor. The communication links between configuration members are of bounded capacity and
no labels from a non-member can be added to the local state of the member processors (since they are not
considered by line 6) nor can be added to the communication links between the processors (line 16). Hence,
the algorithm reduces every execution R to an instance of providing self-stabilizing labels. 2
The corollary follows since we can use the solution to the fixed processor set problem to solve each
instance of the problem whenever a reconfiguration is not taking place. In particular Algorithm 4.2 and
line 16 comprise of the solution given in [11] to solve the fixed-set problem.
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Corollary 4.3 Consider an execution R of Algorithm 4.1 starting in an arbitrary state. While a reconfig-
uration is not taking place, the solution provided by [11] can be used to guarantee that a maximal label
created by a member of the configuration will eventually be adopted by all active members.
The theorem follows.
Theorem 4.4 Starting in an arbitrary state, Algorithm 4.1 provides a maximal label. If a reconfiguration
does not take place then there can be up to O(N(N2 + m)) label creations before a maximal label is
established. If a reconfiguration takes place then there can be up to O(N2) label creations.
Proof. By Corollary 4.3 Algorithm 4.1 reaches a maximal label. By the results of Dolev et al [11] the worse
case takes place when starting in an arbitrary state which requires at most O(N(N2 + m)) label creations,
where m is the system’s communication link capacity in labels and in our case N ≥ v. A processor may
create a label with its own identifier the label it considers as maximal is canceled and it knows of no other
labels. Labels that are possibly unknown to some processor and may cancel its maximal label, are found
either in the local state (|max[•]| ≤ N and |storedLabels[N ]| ≤ 2N(N2 + m− 1)), or in transit between
configuration members. Note that in an arbitrary state, the configuration may happen to be valid and not
require a change, although the labels in the system may be corrupt. This is a worse case scenario that
requires possibly O(N(N2 + m)) label creations until the maximal label is reached.
Nevertheless, if a reconfiguration takes place, then the snap stabilizing link will clear the m labels found
in the communication links and any active participant will empty their local queues in storedLabels[]. The
only source of labels that could possibly force a processor to create new labels in order to find a maximal,
are the max[] arrays. There are up to N such arrays of size at most N , and hence O(N2) possible label
creations. 2
4.2 Counter Increment Algorithms
Using the labeling algorithm, we implement a practically infinite self-stabilizing counter, inexhaustible for
the lifetime of most known systems (e.g., with upper bound of 264). We first show how to move from labels
to counters and then provide a description of the algorithm along with a correctness proof.
4.2.1 Description
Counters. The labeling scheme used above, can be used to implement counters. The idea is to extend
the labeling scheme to handle counters, where a counter is a triple 〈label, seqn,wid〉, where seqn is an
integer sequence number, ranging from 0 to 2b, where b is large enough, say b = 64; and wid the processor
identifier of the seqn creator (not necessarily the same as the label’s creator). Specifically, we say that
counter ct1 = 〈`1, seqn1, wid1〉 is smaller than counter ct2 = 〈`2, seqn2, wid2〉, and write that ct1 ≺ct ct2,
if (`1 ≺ `2), or ((`1 = `2) and (seqn1 < seqn2)), or ((`1 = `2) and (seqn1 = seqn2) and (wid1 < wid2)).
Note that when processors have the same label, the above relation forms a total ordering and processors can
increment a shared counter also when attempting to do so concurrently. Also, when the labels of the two
counters from the same processor are incomparable, the counters are also incomparable.
Outline. Algorithm 4.3 maintains counters as Algorithm 4.1 maintains labels. Counter increment for a
participant that is not a configuration member is seen in Algorithm 4.5, and for a member, which also bears
the responsibility to maintain the maximal counter, in Algorithm 4.4. A participant that wants to increment
the counter, first queries the configuration for the maximal counter. It only needs to consider the responses
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Algorithm 4.3: Self-stabilizing Counter Management Algorithm for Reconfiguration; code for pi ∈
config
1 (Let v be the size of the configuration config as returned by getConfig()).
2 Variables: A counter is a triple 〈lbl, seqn, wid〉 where lbl is a label of the labeling scheme, seqn is the sequence number
related to lbl, and wid is the identifier of the creator of this seqn. A counter pair 〈mct, cct〉 extends a label pair. cct is a
canceling counter for mct, such that cct.lbl 6≺lb mct.lbl or cct.lbl = ⊥. We rename structures max[] and storedLabels[]
of Alg. 4.2 to maxC[] and storedCnts[] that hold counter pairs instead of label pairs. Array maxC[v] of counter pairs
〈mct, cct〉: maxC[i] is pi’s largest counter pair, maxC[j] refers to pj’s maxCj [j] counter pair that was last sent to pi
(canceled when maxC[•].cct.lbl 6= ⊥). storedCnts[v]: an array of queues of the counter pairs, where storedCnts[j]
holds the counters with labels created by pj ∈ config. For pj ∈ (config \ {pi}), storedCnts[j]’s queue size is limited
to (v +m) w.r.t. counter pairs, where m is the maximum number of counter pairs that can be in transit in the system. The
storedCnts[i]’s queue size is limited to (v(v2 +m)) + v pairs.
3 Interfaces: noReco() returns False (from the reconfiguration module) when a reconfiguration is taking place, and True
otherwise. getConfig() returns the current configuration if one exists. counterReceiptAction((〈cnt, cnt, id〉) -
executes the function counterReceiptAction((〈lbl, lbl, id〉) of Algorithm 4.2 adjusted for counter structures and
handling counters. For counter pairs with the same mct label, only the instance with the greatest counter w.r.t. ≺ct is
retained. In case where one counter is canceled, we keep the canceled. For ease of presentation we assume that a counter
with a label created by pi in line 27 of Algorithm 4.2, is initiated with a seqn = 0 and wid = i. A call of
counterReceiptAction() (without arguments) essentially ignores lines 18 and 19 of Alg. 4.2.
4 Operators: rebuild(v) rebuilds the storedCnts[] array of queues and maxC[] to have v entries. It also adjusts the queue
size for the new v. emptyAllQueues() clears all storedCnts[] queues. confChange() returns True if a reconfiguration
has taken place, and False otherwise, by comparing the current counter structures with the result of getConfig().
enqueue(ctp) - places a counter pair ctp at the front of a queue. If ctp.mct.lbl already exists in the queue, it only
maintains the instance with the greatest counter w.r.t. ≺ct, placing it at the front of the queue. If one counter pair is
canceled then the canceled copy is the one retained.
5 Notation: Let y and y′ be two records that include the field x. We denote y =x y′ ≡ (y.x = y′.x).
6 Macros:
7 cleanCP (x) = if (∃` ∈ x.〈mct, cct〉.lbl, pj 6∈ curConf) : `.lCreator = pj) then return 〈⊥,⊥〉 else return x;
8 exhausted(ctp) = (ctp.mct.seqn ≥ 264)
9 legit(ctp) = (ctp.cct = ⊥〉)
10 cancelExhausted(ctp) : ctp.cct← ctp.mct
11 cancelExhaustedMaxC() : foreach pj ∈ config, c ∈ maxC[j] : exhausted(c) do cancelExhausted(maxC[j])
12 function cleanMax() foreach pj ∈ curConf, ` ∈ maxC[j].〈mct, cct〉.lbl : `.lCreator = pk 6∈ curConf do
maxC[j]← 〈⊥,⊥〉
13 do forever begin
14 if noReco() = True ∧ confChange() = True then
15 curConf = getConfig();
16 rebuild(|curConf |);
17 emptyAllQueues();
18 cleanMax();
19 counterReceiptAction(〈⊥,maxC[i], pi〉);
20 upon transmitReady(pk ∈ curConf \ {pi}) begin
21 if noReco() = True ∧ confChange() = False then
22 transmit(〈maxC[i],maxC[k]〉 ← 〈cleanCP (maxC[i]), cleanCP (maxC[k])〉)
23 upon receive(〈sentMax, lastSent〉) from pk ∈ curConf begin
24 if noReco() = True ∧ confChange() = False then
25 cleanMax();
26 〈sentMax, lastSent〉 = 〈cleanCP (sentMax), cleanCP (lastSent)〉;
27 counterReceiptAction(〈sentMax, lastSent, pk〉);
28 upon request to increment counter inc() begin
29 if noReco() = True ∧ confChange() = False then return incrementCounter(getConfig())
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of the majority, because the intersection property of majorities guarantees at least one member that holds the
most recent value of a completed counter increment. Having this maximal counter, seqn is incremented and
written back to the configuration, awaiting for acknowledgments from a majority. This is, in spirit, similar
to the two-phase write operation of MWMR register implementations, focusing on the sequence number
rather than on an associated value.
Configuration members have the extra task of retaining the maximal value and ensuring the convergence
property. To that end, they exchange their maximal counter and update their counter structures in the same
way as in the labeling algorithm. The maximal counter needs to have the maximal label held by the con-
figuration members and the highest sequence number, breaking symmetry with the writer identifier. If this
maximal sequence number is exhausted, members proceed to find a new maximal label, using the maximal
sequence number known for this epoch label (possibly 0 if it is a newly created or unused label).
Variables. The counter management algorithm (Algorithm 4.3) uses the same structures and procedures
as the labeling algorithm, but now with counters instead of labels. Specifically we name the max[•] array to
maxC[•] and the storedLabels•] array of label queues to storedCnts[•] array of counter queues. Proces-
sors only hold one copy of a counter with the same label, namely the one with the highest seqn (breaking
ties with wid). Processors send and receive pairs of counters 〈mct, cct〉 where the first is the believed max-
imal counter, and the second a cancelling counter. While cct = ⊥ then mct is not-cancelled and can be
considered as a valid candidate for the local maximal counter. When a counter becomes exhausted, i.e., its
seqn exceeds 2b, mct becomes canceled by assigning cct← mct.
Interfaces and Operators. counterReceiptAction(〈lbl, lbl, id〉) is an interface to Algorithm 4.2 which
now acts on and maintains counter pairs rather than label pairs. It concludes by naming a local maximal
label. We do not present this algorithm again as it is essentially the same, less naming “counter” in place of
“label”. The rest of the interfaces and operators are detailed at the beginning the algorithms in which they
are being used for the first time.
Maintaining a maximal counter. Algorithm 4.3 presents how Algorithm 4.1 is modified to maintain a
largest counter (rather than just the largest label), by exchanging the local maximal counters with other
configuration members. The conditions that prevent send/receive during reconfiguration are the same. Sim-
ilarly, the above actions do not take place after reconfiguration, until the structures are rebuild and reset in
exactly the same way as described by the labeling algorithm. In addition, the same conditions that prevent
send/receive also prevent incrementing the counter (line 29).
Counter increment for configuration members. Algorithm 4.4 shows how configuration members in-
crement the counter. A member pi first sends a query to all other members requesting the counter that they
consider as the global maximum and awaits for responses from a majority. These counters are gathered
and passed to the counter structures (line 19). Using the counterReceiptAction() the algorithm eventually
finds the maximal epoch label and the maximal sequence number it knows for this label. In other words,
it collects counters and finds the counter(s) with the largest global label; there can be more than one such
counter, in which case it returns the one with the highest sequence number, breaking symmetry with the
sequence number processor ids. Then it checks whether this maximal sequence number is exhausted. When
this is the case, it proceeds to find a new maximal label until it finds one that is not exhausted and uses
the maximal sequence number it knows for this epoch label. The processor then increments the sequence
number by one, sets its identifier as the writer of the sequence number (line 12) and sends the new counter
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Algorithm 4.4: Counter Increment for configuration member pi ∈ config; code for pi
1 Variables, Interfaces and Macros are found in Algorithm 4.3.
2 Operator: abort() aborts the procedure and returns ⊥.
3 Notation: Let y and y′ be two records that include the field x. We denote y =x y′ ≡ (y.x = y′.x).
4 Macros:
5 retCntrQ(ct) : return (storedCnts[ct.lbl.lCreator])
6 legitCounters() = {maxC[j].mct : ∃pj ∈ config ∧ legit(maxC[j])}
7 getMaxSeq() : return maxwid({maxseqn({ctp : ctp.mct ∈ legitCounters() ∧maxC[i] =mct.lbl ctp})})
8 procedure incrementCounter(config) begin
9 majRead();
10 repeat
11 findMaxCounter();
12 until legit(maxC[i]) ∧ ¬exhausted(maxC[i]);
13 let newCntr = 〈maxC[i].mct.lbl,maxC[i].mct.seqn+ 1, i〉;
14 if majWrite(newCntr) then maxC[i]← newCntr;
15 retCntrQ(maxC[i].mct).enqueue(maxC[i])return maxC[i];
16 procedure majRead() begin
17 foreach pj ∈ config do send majMaxRead() while waiting for responses from majority of config do
18 upon receipt of m from pj ∈ config do
19 if m = Abort then abort() else maxC[j]← cleanCP (m)
20 upon request for majMaxRead() from pj begin
21 if noReco() then
22 findMaxCounter();
23 send maxCi[i] to pj ;
24 else send Abort
25 procedure findMaxCounter() begin
26 cancelExhaustedMaxC();
27 counterReceiptAction();
28 maxC[i]← getMaxSeq();
29 procedure majWrite(maxCi[i]) begin
30 foreach pj ∈ config do send majMaxWrite(maxCi[i]) wait for ACK from majority of config;
31 if Abort received then abort()
32 upon request for majMaxWrite(maxj) from pj begin
33 if noReco() = True then
34 maxCi[j]← cleanCT (maxct(maxj ,maxCi[j]));
35 if maxj =lbl.lCreator i then storedCntsi[i].enqueue(maxC[i])if exhausted(maxCi[j]) then
cancelExhausted(maxCi[j])send ACK to pj ;
36 else send Abort
to all members, awaiting for acknowledgments from a majority. Note that read and write requests during
reconfigurations are answered with Abort. When the processor requesting the read/write receives an Abort
it immediately terminates the increment procedure returning ⊥.
Counter increment for non-member participants. As per Algorithm 4.5, participants that do not belong
to the configuration, request counters from a majority of configuration members. They request the greatest
with respect to ≺ct counter that is non-exhausted and legit. They then increment and write this to a majority
of the configuration. If at any point during read or write they receive an Abort, they stop the procedure and
return⊥. The same happens if they do not manage to find a maximal counter after the read. They can expect
though that because of the counter propagation and the correctness of the labeling algorithm, such a counter
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Algorithm 4.5: Counter Increment for non-member participant pi 6∈ config; code for pi
1 procedure incrementCounter(config) begin
2 let counters = majRead();
3 if ∀ct ∈ counter,∃ct′ ∈ counter : (¬exhausted(ct′)) ∧ (legit(ct′)) ∧ (ct ct ct′) then
4 let maxCounter = ct′ else let maxCounter = ⊥
5 if maxCntr 6= ⊥ then
6 let newCntr = 〈maxCntr.lbl,maxCntr.seqn+ 1, i〉;
7 if majWrite(newCntr) then return maxCntr else return ⊥
8 else return ⊥
9 procedure majRead() begin
10 let counters = ∅;
11 foreach pj ∈ config do send majMaxRead() while |counters| ≤ |config|2 do
12 upon receipt of m from pj ∈ config do if m = Abort then abort() else counters.add(m)
13 return counters;
14 procedure majWrite(maxCntr) begin
15 foreach pj ∈ config do send majMaxWrite(maxCntr) if ACK from majority of config received then wait;
16 else if Abort received then abort();
will eventually appear.
4.2.2 Correctness
Lemma 4.5 Starting from an arbitrary state, in an execution R of Algorithm 4.3, configuration members
eventually converge to a global maximal label.
Proof. We note that the result asks that configuration members reach to a global maximal label, and thus it is
not assume that they all hold the same seqn and wid corresponding to this label. We prove in a step-by-step
fashion, following the labeling algorithm lemmas and explaining how the new algorithms allow do not affect
the correctness.
(i) Initially we note that labels by non-members are in an identical way as in the labeling algorithm excluded
and cannot be reintroduced to the system (Lemma 4.1). This is immediate for Algorithm 4.3. Also lines 19
and 34 of Algorithm 4.4 guarantee that counters read during reads or writes are set to ⊥ if they have labels
by processors not in the current configuration.
(ii) In the same way as the labeling algorithm here is reduced the algorithm of [11] we perform the same
reduction on the counter algorithm, by running the algorithm on the configuration member set and having
each instance of the counter algorithm correspond to the fixed-set case. (iii) By this we conclude that we
reach to a global maximal label for all active members. The bounds given by Theorem 4.4 are still relevant,
since as we have explained, counters with a corrupted seqn and counters with a corrupt label are bounded
by the same numbers. Thus a counter may be adopted but then be exhausted very quickly, because it was
initialized near its maximum. Thus eventually any corrupt counters will be removed. 2
Theorem 4.6 Starting from an arbitrary state, Algorithms 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5 eventually establish a monoton-
ically increasing counter within the configuration that they are being executed.
Proof. We first note that Lemma 4.5 ensures that processors reach to a maximal label. We establish that
any two calls to incrementCounter() return a strictly ordered counter value. Consider a processor pi
performing a counter increment. Given that no reconfiguration takes place and thus no aborts take place
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during counter reads or writes, then if a majority has received the global counter cnt then by the intersection
property of majorities, pi must receive at least one copy of cnt when it reads (line 7 for Alg. 4.4 and line 4.5
for Alg. 4.5). For Algorithm 4.5 if any of the counters collected is legit and not exhausted it is incremented,
and written back to a majority of configuration members with the writer’s wid. In the members’ algorithm,
a member can always find a maximal counter (with Algorithm 4.3, even if the majority did not manage to
return a legit, non-exhausted counter. Note that members always hold the greatest counter and discard of the
smaller one. This ensures that after the write completes, any subsequent call to incrementCounter() will
return at least one copy of this new greatest value. Concurrent calls to incrementCounter() may return to
two processors pi and pj the same global maximal counter. This will be incremented by both to the same
seqn, but will will be written with different wid’s, so assuming i < j, any subsequent comparison will
give the counter by pj as the maximal. Hence the counter algorithm establishes a monotonically increasing
counter. Also note, that for non-members, the algorithm will return a greater counter than the last completed
call at the time of the call, or will return a ⊥, in cases where reconfiguration is taking place, or where it
is impossible to find a maximal counter, since the labels have yet to converge (and therefore incomparable
counters exist). 2
4.3 Reconfigurable Virtually Synchronous State Machine Replication
The self-stabilizing reconfiguration service together with the self-stabilizing labeling and counter scheme,
can extend the capabilities of various applications to run on more dynamic settings. Virtual synchrony is
an established technique for achieving state machine replication (SMR). We have recently presented a self-
stabilizing virtually synchronous SMR algorithm for a fixed set of processors [11]. We now discuss how this
virtually synchronous SMR solution can benefit from the reconfiguration service to run on more dynami-
cally changing environments. We note that applications can use the reconfiguration service to guarantee
continuous service, only when a delicate reconfigurations take place between periods of steady configura-
tion and not when brute reconfiguration takes place. Nevertheless, brute reconfiguration guarantees that,
after a transient fault, the service will eventually return to the desired behavior.
A view is a the set of processors with a unique identifier, that allows to the view members to achieve
reliable multicast within the view. The self-stabilizing reconfigurable virtually synchronous SMR task is
specified such that any two processors that are together in any two consecutive views will deliver the same
messages in their respective views and preserve the same state. Moreover, the two views can be belong to two
different consecutive configurations when the second configuration was the result of delicate reconfiguration.
A pseudocode is found in Algorithm 4.7 and a description and correctness proof follows.
4.3.1 Description
Obtaining a coordinator. The virtual synchrony algorithm of [11] is coordinator-based and works on
the primary component given the supportive majority assumption on the failure detectors. This assump-
tion states that a majority of processors of the (fixed) processor set mutually never suspect some processor
on their failure detectors throughout an infinite execution, given that this processor does not crash. The
proof of [11] establishes that such a supported processor eventually becomes the coordinator throughout the
execution.
We modify the definition of supportive majority so that a majority of the configuration members’ set
(config) needs to provide such support to the coordinator. Out of the current config, any config member
with supporting majority can obtain a counter from the labeling and counter algorithms that are run on
config. The processor with the greatest counter, becomes the coordinator and establishes a view reflecting
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Algorithm 4.6: Coordinator-led delicate reconfiguration; code for processor pi
1 Interfaces: needDelicateReconf() returns True/False on whether pi is the coordinator and whether application criteria
requires and is ready for a a reconfiguration.
/* Replaces line 16 of Reconfiguration Management layer */
17 else if needDelicateReconf() then
its own local failure detector, and with the counter as its view identifier1. In doing so it also collects the
states from view members as well as undelivered messages and synchronizes to create the most up-to-date
state for the view members to replicate. The coordinator changes the view when the view set does not reflect
its failure detector set. View members follow the view composition and state of the coordinator. Upon
coordinator collapse, the same process provides a new coordinator and preserves the state. Note that the
correctness for this is immediate from the correctness proofs of [11].
Coordinator-controlled joins. By the joining protocol, before a joiner tries to become a participant, it has
any application-related local data set to ⊥. The coordinator is the one that controls whether the application
may or may not allow joining processors to become participants. Several approaches may be used to give
permission to joiners. The coordinator may allow joining whenever it detects that more participants are
required, by raising a flag and warning config members that they can allow access to the application.
This can be easily applied to our current joining protocol (Algorithm 3.3) where configuration members
implement the passQuery() interface, simply by returning their most recent True/False value they have for
the coordinator’s flag. Another approach would be for a configuration member to provide the coordinator’s
details to the joiner so that joiners may, by directly communicating with the coordinator, gain permission to
become participants.
Note that in both cases, joiners may become participants but they have yet to gain access to the applica-
tion. This takes place if they are part of the coordinator’s FD and are subsequently included in the next view.
In becoming part of the view they also acquire a copy of the most recent state and begin state replication.
This gives leverage to the application when controlling the number of processors that are allowed to access
the application.
Coordinator-initiated reconfiguration. The coordinator can be given the authority to initiate delicate
reconfigurations. This implies that there is no need for the prediction functions of a majority of processors to
support a reconfiguration before it can take place, but it only suffices for a coordinator to be in place, in order
to take the decision for reconfiguration based on application-specific criteria and suspend changes to the
state during reconfiguration. To this end, line 16 of Algorithm 3.2 that triggers the delicate reconfiguration
in Algorithm 3.1 is replaced with line 17 of Algorithm 4.6. The needReconf flag is rendered unnecessary
for this cause.
Before reconfiguration. In order to initiate a reconfiguration that will not result in loss of the state of
the replicas, the coordinator must ensure that all view processors have the most recent state and that the
exchange of messages is suspended. We require that for the state to survive to the first view of the next
configuration, at least one replica of the last view before reconfiguration must not crash.
1We may occasionally refer to view members and this should not be confused with configuration members, although a majority
of configuration members must belong to the view
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Algorithm 4.7: Self-stabilizing reconfigurable VS SMR; code for participant pi
1 Interfaces: fetch() next multicast message, apply(state,msg) applies the step msg to state (while producing side
effects), synchState(replica) returns a replica consolidated state, synchMsgs(replica) returns a consolidated array of
last delivered messages, inc() returns a counter from the increment counter algorithm, getConfig() returns the latest
configuration and noReco() returns True/False on whether a reconfiguration is not taking place (Algorithm 3.1),
evalConf() is the reconfiguration prediction function returning True/False.
2 Variables: The following arrays consider both pi’s own value (the i-th entry) and pj’s most recently received value (the
j-th entry). state[•] = 〈view = 〈ID, set〉, status ∈ {Multicast, Propose, Install}, (multicast round number) rnd,
(replica) state, (last delivered messages)msg[n] (to the state machine), (last fetched) input (to the state
machine), propV = 〈ID, set〉, (no coordinator alive) noCrd, (message delivery) suspend〉 : an array of state
variables. FD[j].crd returns the last reported identifier of pj’s local coordinator which is continuously propagated using
the token exchange (see Section 2). It is ⊥ if pj has no coordinator.
3 Function needDelicateReconf() = (reconfReady = True ∧ valCrd = pi ∧ evalConfig() = True);
4 Do forever begin
5 let curConf = getConfig(); // Gets latest config set
6 let seemCrd = {p` = state[`].propV.ID.wid ∈ FD.part ∩ curConfig : (|state[`].propV.set| >
b|curConf |/2c) (|state[`].FD.part| > bconfig/2c) ∧ (p` ∈ state[`].propV.set) ∧ (pk ∈ state[`].propV.set↔
p` ∈ FD[k].part) ∧ ((state[`].status =Multicast)→ (state[`].(view = propV ) ∧ crd(`) = `)) ∧
((state[`].status = Install)→ FD[`].crd = `)};
7 let valCrd = {p` ∈ seemCrd : (∀pk ∈ seemCrd : state[k].propV.ID ct state[`].propV.ID)};
8 noCrd← (|valCrd| 6= 1); FD[i].crd← valCrd;
9 if (valCrd = {pi} ∧ status = Multicast ∧ reconfReady = True) then
suspend← (reconfReady ← evalConfig()) else if
(valCrd 6= {pi}) ∧ (valCrd = {p`} ∧ state[`].status ∈ {Propose, Install}) then
suspend← (reconfReady ← False) if noReco() = False then suspend← True
10 if (|FD.part ∩ curConf | > b|curConf |/2c) ∧ (((|valCrd| 6= 1) ∧ (|{pk ∈ FD.part : pi ∈ FD[k].part ∧
state[k].noCrd}| > b|curConf |/2c)) ∨ ((valCrd = {pi}) ∧ (FD.part 6= propV.set) ∧ (|{pk ∈ FD.part :
state[k].propV = propV }| > b|curConf |/2c))) ∧ noReco() then (status, propV )← (Propose, 〈inc(),
FD.part〉)
11 else if (valCrd = {pi}) ∧ (∀ pj ∈ view.set : state[j].(view, status, rnd) = (view, status, rnd)) ∨ ((status 6=
Multicast) ∧ (∀ pj ∈ propV.set : state[j].(propV, status) = (propV,Propose)) then
12 if status = Multicast ∧ reconfReady = False then
13 apply(state,msg); suspend← evalConf();
14 if (reconfReady ← (∀pk ∈ view.set : rep[k].suspend = True)) = False) ∨ (noReco() = True) then
15 input← fetch();
16 foreach pj ∈ P do if pj ∈ view.set then msg[j]← state[j].input else msg[j]← ⊥
rnd← rnd+ 1;
17 else if status = Propose then (state, status,msg)← (synchState(state), Install, synchMsgs(state)) else
if status = Install then (view, status, rnd, suspend, reconfReady)← (propV,Multicast, 0, False,False)
18 else if valCrd = {p`} ∧ ` 6= i ∧ ((state[`].rnd = 0 ∨ rnd < state[`].rnd ∨ state[`].(view 6= propV )) then
19 if state[`].status = Multicast ∧ suspend = False then
20 state[i]← state[`]; /* also adopts suspend flag */
21 apply(state, state[`].msg); /* for the sake of side-effects */
22 if state[`].suspend = False then input← fetch()
23 else if state[`].status = Install then state[i]← state[`] else if state[`].status = Propose then
(status, propV )← state[`].(status, propV )
24 let sendSet = (seemCrd ∪ {pk ∈ propV.set : valCrd = {pi}} ∪ {pk ∈ FD : noCrd ∨ (status = Propose)})
25 foreach pj ∈ sendSet do send(state[i])
26 Upon message arrival m from pj do state[j]← m;
When the coordinator is informed by its prediction function that reconfiguration is required, it performs
a multicast round to gather the most recent state and received messages, but also raises a suspend flag that
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it propagates with the current state. It waits until all view members return their current state and messages
and that they have suspended new messages. Upon receiving this information it performs a final multicast
round to ensure that the last state with the messages have been received and applied and then calls the
reconfiguration through Algorithm 3.2. Note that in case of coordinator crash, a new view coordinator
needs to be established before the reconfiguration can take place, which adds an extra delay.
After reconfiguration. Once the labeling and increment counter algorithm have stabilized to a new max
counter any member of the new configuration has access to a counter value in order to become the coordi-
nator. Processors propagate their state which can be either the last before reconfiguration or ] in case they
are newly joining processors. The new coordinator will synchronize the states and messages and establish
the new view so that the service can continue, and will also resume the application for new messages to be
fetched. This is in essence a mere view installation with nothing additional to the algorithm of [11].
Providing service. Inside the view, the basic functionality of the algorithm of [11], i.e., reliable multicast
and state replication, are not in any way obstructed by the underlying reconfiguration service when a recon-
figuration is not taking place. Additionally, view changes are not affected when reconfiguration is not taking
place.
4.3.2 Correctness
We establish the correctness of the algorithm, by extending the correctness results of [11]. We first prove
that the proposed service (Algorithm 4.7), when working in an established configuration, is an execution of
the algorithm of [11] and thus the correctness for that case follows. We then consider the stabilization of the
application after a reconfiguration, and conclude by establishing that state replication is unaffected as to its
correctness when a delicate reconfiguration that was initiated by the coordinator takes place.
Lemma 4.7 Starting in an arbitrary state in an execution R, stale information can only cause a single
reconfiguration throughout R, unless the prediction mechanism evalConfig() allows it.
Proof. We note that stale information relating to reconfiguration consist of suspend and the copies of
suspend exchanged with every other processor, and reconfReady, as well as valCrd that may result
from stale information as per lines 5 and 5. We pay attention to when the conditions are satisfied for the
needDelicateReconf() interface (line 3). This is called by a processor that believes itself to be the coor-
dinator (valCrd = pi), in order to initiate a delicate reconfiguration in the modified Algorithm 4.6. The
three conditions are: (i) evalConfig() returns True, (ii) All processors of the view have suspend = True,
(iii) The caller believes itself to be the coordinator, i.e., valCrd = pi. We will refer to a coordinator as one
who has established its view in the primary component of the config, and other config members follow
this processor in performing state replication. We study the following three complementary cases.
Case 1 – A non-coordinator pi that does not believe itself to be the coordinator. (I.e., valCrd 6= pi) In
this case, pi cannot initiate a reconfiguration since condition (iii) will always fail.
Case 2 – A non-coordinator pi that believes it is the coordinator. (I.e., valCrd = pi locally for pi, but
valCrd 6= pi for a set of other processors greater than the majority of the config.) In [11] processors such
as pi are proved to eventually stop believing to be the coordinator due to propagation of information assump-
tion. Nevertheless, before information may be propagated, such a processor’s stale information, can cause
a reconfiguration if the conditions are satisfied. Note that after reconfiguration takes place, this processor
needs to again establish its (alleged) coordinatorship before it reconfigures again and in the process it needs
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to reset its suspend variables (line 9.
Case 3 – A coordinator pi with corrupt initial state, cannot cause a reconfiguration in case
evalConfig() = False. It may cause a reconfiguration if also satisfies condition (ii) due to corruption
and evalConfig() = True. This cannot be distinguished from the non-transient case. As already noted,
after reconfiguration takes place, this coordinator needs to again establish its coordinatorship and in the
process it needs to reset its suspend variables (line 9). 2
Lemma 4.8 Consider an execution R of Algorithm 4.7 in which the following hold throughout: (i) the
supportive majority assumption, (ii) no reconfiguration takes place (and therefore a valid configuration
config is in place) and (iii) evalConfig() = False. Then this execution is a reduction to the execution of
the self-stabilizing virtually synchronous SMR algorithm of [11].
Proof. The mapping of the fixed set of processors of [11] (that was named P where |P | = n) to the set
of config, creates the fixed set (throughout R) that provides the supportive majority (of b|config|/2c)
for at least one processor of the configuration to eventually become the coordinator. While the views can
also include non-member processors (that are participants), safety is provided by the majority of config
members. We note that the algorithm in its structure has not changed less the fact of replacing the old
fixed set with config, and the addition of the suspend mechanism which is not activated at any point,
since evalConfig() = False throughout R. We thus deduce that the lemma is a reduction to the non-
reconfigurable VS SMR and we deduce the following corollary. 2
Corollary 4.9 Consider an execution R of Algorithm 4.7 in which the following hold throughout: (i) the
supportive majority assumption, (ii) no reconfiguration takes place (and therefore a valid configuration
config is in place) and (iii) evalConfig() = False. Then, by Lemma 4.8 and the correctness of [11],
starting from an arbitrary state, Algorithm 4.7 simulates state machine replication preserving the virtual
synchrony property.
Lemma 4.10 Consider an infinite execution R of Algorithm 4.7 with an established coordinator pi. If
evalConfigi() = True from some system state c ∈ R onwards, then we reach another system state c′ ∈ R
in which a reconfiguration eventually take place (and after which evalConfig() = False).
Proof. From c onwards, the established coordinator pi receives True whenever it calls evalConfig(). This
implies that because of line 13 statei[i].suspend = True always. This value is sent in every iteration of the
Algorithm by pi (lines 18–25) to every processor in the view, and adopted by every processor in the view
through lines 26 and 20. Every view member pj adopting pi’s state in statej [i] (along with suspend = True)
propagates statej [j].suspend = True back to pi. Due to assumption that a message sent infinitely often
is received infinitely often, eventually the coordinator learns that every processor in its view has adopted
suspend = True.
If during this process the coordinator needs to change the view (due to failure detector changes), then
this should take place and the above procedure starts again after the view installation (because installation
by line 17 forces suspend = False. The same takes place if the coordinator is lost, in which case by line 9
and the previous remark about installation falsify suspend flags, and the procedure for reconfiguring should
be taken up by the next coordinator.
If every processor in the view has suspend = True and pi has been informed of this, then line 14
sets reconfReady to True for the coordinator, and line 9 retains this value since evalConfig() = True
by assumption. Hence, whenever the coordinator uses the reconfiguration manager (Algorithm 4.6) to run
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line 17, it will find that all conditions of needDelicateReconf() are satisfied, thus the coordinator can
move on to initiate the reconfiguration using the configEstb() interface of the reconfiguration scheme, and
hence the result. 2
Lemma 4.11 Consider an infinite execution R of Algorithm 4.7, starting from a system state c′ as in
Lemma 4.10. We eventually reach a new state c′′ ∈ R in which a new configuration is installed and a
new valid coordinator is established in the primary component of config.
Proof. Starting from system state c′, a coordinator pi has already initiated a reconfiguration. During re-
configuration, pi cannot proceed to increment the round number since line 14 allows no round increments
if reconfiguration is taking place. Note that since it is the coordinator that triggers the reconfiguration, this
processor is immediately informed about a reconfiguration through noReco(). By the correctness of the
reconfiguration and stability assurance layer, we are guaranteed that the reconfiguration will complete and
so we move from a configuration config to a new one config′.
When the reconfiguration completes, every processor in the new configuration config′ should try to
establish that there is a coordinator installed. Even if pi survives to config′, it will need to change the view
because of the change in configuration, although it will still consider itself as the coordinator. By the second
set of conditions that allow view proposal, if ((valCrd = {pi}) ∧ (FDi[i].part 6= propV.set) ∧ (|{pk ∈
FDi[i].part : statei[k].propV = propVi}| > b|config′|/2c))), namely if there is a majority of active
maembers that follow the previously proposed view of pi, then pi is eligible to create a new view. Otherwise,
any processor p` may trigger, given that the following conditions are satisfied. (i) |FD`[`].part|∩config′| >
b|config′|/2c (pj can trust a majority of the configuration). (ii) The set of processors in FD`[`].part that
p` trusts and p` knows to have their trust must state that they have no coordinator. Note that by our majority
supportive assumption and the eventual reception of messages, some processor will reach a state in which it
will be able to propose.
The correctness arguments of [11] complete the proof (by Corollary 4.9), and so some processor man-
ages to become the coordinator. 2
Lemma 4.12 Consider an infinite execution R of Algorithm 4.7 that contains a system state c′ as defined in
Lemma 4.10 and a following state c′′ as guaranteed by Lemma 4.11. The replica state is preserved from c′
to c′′.
Proof. We examine how the state at the time of reconfiguration triggering, during and after reconfiguration
remains unchanged until a coordinator is in place and initiates multicasting.
Step 1 – We establish that the state of the replicas before reconfiguration, is preserved. By Lemma 4.10,
processor are led to turn their flag suspend to False, when the coordinator pi suggests that a reconfigu-
ration must take place. In the next multicast round when every non-coordinator processor receives pi’s
suspend = True it adopts the last state (line 20), applies changes to the state 21 and fetches multicast
messages only if the suspend flag is False. Similarly, the coordinator applies the changes to the state 21 after
all the view members have adopted its state, and renews its suspend flag (which should always return True,
otherwise the suspension process stops). If all the participants have suspended (otherwise condition (∀ pj
∈ view.set : statei[j].(view, status, rnd) = statei[i].(view, status, rnd)) of line 10 would not hold),
then line 14 must return True so reconfReady = True and the coordinator does not fetch new messages
(line 15) and stops incrementing round numbers.
Step 2 – During reconfiguration, no new multicasts and message fetch() may take place, since non-
coordinators of config cannot access line 19 due to the conditions of 18. They also cannot propose a
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new view during reconfiguration, by the last condition of line 10. So their suspend flags are preserved to
sfTrue throughout the reconfiguration (also by line 9). The coordinator’s flag is also maintained to True if
reconfiguration is taking place.
Step 3 – After the new configuration config′ is in place, new processors are assumed to access the
computation with default values in their state, and cannot therefore introduce new messages or replica state.
Processors coming from config, carry the last state and for liveness we assume a single of these processors
is alive and included in the proposed view set of the next coordinator. That a new proposal takes place, it
is suggested by Lemma 4.11. So the new coordinator (possibly the same as the one before reconfiguration)
will gather all available states and messages and create a synchronized state (which is only for stabilization
purposes here, since no new messages were allowe to be fetched and there should be only one version of
last state). Note that the suspend flags are set to False for every processor when reconfiguration finishes
and when a valid view proposal is found (line 9). 2
The above lemmas lead to the following theorem.
Theorem 4.13 Starting in an arbitrary state in an execution R of Algorithm 4.7, the algorithm simulates
state machine replication preserving the virtual synchrony property, even in the case of reconfiguration when
this is delicate, i.e., when initiated by needDelicateReconf().
Self-stabilizing reconfigurable emulation of shared memory. Birman et al. [5] show how a virtual syn-
chrony solution can lead to a reconfigurable emulation of shared memory. Following this approach, and
using our self-stabilizing reconfigurable SMR solution discussed in this section, and our increment counter
scheme (Section 4.2), we can obtain a self-stabilizing reconfigurable emulation of shared memory. Given a
conflict-free configuration, a typical two-phase read and write protocol can be used for the shared memory
emulation. In the event of a delicate reconfiguration, the coordinator (of the virtual synchrony algorithm)
suspends reads and writes on the register and once a new configuration is established, the emulation contin-
ues. Virtual synchrony ensures that the state of the system, in this case the state of the object, is preserved
(c.f., Theorem 4.13). In the event of a brute force reconfiguration (e.g. due to transient faults or violation
of the churn rate), the system will automatically recover and eventually reach a legal execution (in this case
the state of the system may be lost).
We note that our proposed self-stablizing reconfigurable SMR and shared memory emulation solutions
are suspending, in the sense that they do not provide service during a reconfiguration. With some extra
care and under certain conditions we believe that they can be modified to provide continuous service, but
in general, it remains an interesting open question whether a self-stabilizing service, such as reconfigurable
SMR or distributed shared memory that does not suspend, is possible. In [5], Birman et al. discuss the
tradeoffs of suspending and non suspending reconfiguration (such as the ones provided in [17] and [2]). It
is argued, that suspending services provide some simpler solutions, and may be enhanced for more efficient
reconfiguration decisions so that the time for reconfiguration and state transfer before reconfiguration can
be reduced.
5 Conclusion
We presented the first self-stabilizing reconfiguration scheme that recovers automatically from transient
faults, such as temporary violation of the predefined churn rate or the unexpected activities of processors
and communication channels, using a bounded amount of local storage and message size. We showed
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how this scheme can be used for the implementation of several dynamic distributed services, such as a
self-stabilizing reconfigurable virtual synchrony, which in turn can be used for developing self-stabilizing
reconfigurable SMR and shared memory emulation solutions. We use a number of bootstrapping techniques
for allowing the system to always recover from arbitrary transient faults, for example, when the current
configuration includes no active processors. We believe that the presented techniques provide a generic
blueprint for different solutions that are needed in the area of self-stabilizing high-level communication and
synchronization primitives, which need to deal with processor joins and leaves as well as transient faults.
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